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The Importance
of Ignorance
The move offshore is gaining momentum. No longer
is it limited to the drain and fill operations that
traditionally have claimed land from sea, though
these proceed apace. Today, the stepping stones on
the seaward path are the big rigs in the Gulf, the
North Sea, wherever oil is proved or probable.
Tomorrow, we are told, there will be artificial islands,
floating platforms, and sea-bottom structures for
resource exploitation, manufacturing, waste disposal,
a whole system of activities. The day after that, we
may see residential-commercial-industrial
communities rising above the swells; the near ocean's
most underrated resource may turn out to be space.
This issue is devoted to some of the more
important technological, environmental, and social
aspects of seaward expansion. It is clear from what
the authors have to say that we have become
sophisticated in the construction ol offshore
structures, more so perhaps than most of us realize.
But as so often happens today, what technologists
have learned to do many scientists are not sure
should be done, at least not at flank speed. There is
some friction between the confidence of those who
are solving difficult problems of marine engineering
and the caution of those who are engaged in the
subtler business of measuring stress within the
marine environment.
The case for confidence lends itself to
public acceptance because it is linked to tangible
achievement. The case for caution, with its
implications of self-denial, is not apt to be so popular.
It is nonetheless compelling. Consider petroleum,
the motive force driving much of today's offshore
activities. The substance is known to be harmful
to marine and other environments under certain
circumstances, but according to the organic
geochemist Max Blumer of Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution, it is extraordinarily
difficult to anticipate the full damage. Writing in
the German journal Angcwandte Oiemie, Blumer
explains that the biological effects of chemicals are
immediately related to their fine structures in a way
not yet generally understood despite intensive
research. Therefore, all components of a natural
organic mixture must be known before environmental
chemists and biologists can effectively predict its
impact. Yet, he adds, petroleum, like many other
organic mixtures, is so incredibly complex that
"even the best combinations of analytical techniques,
providing the highest degree of resolution, have not
yet separated any crude oil into individual
components. ... So far, each new analytical
advance appears to have revealed a greater
complexity of nature, and the explosion of
knowledge has been paralleled by an equal explosion
of ignorance."
It is easy, given the crisis mentality endemic
to our society, to ignore the importance of ignorance,
to hang our hopes on the technological fix and the
scientific breakthrough. Certainly what we know
can more effectively guide what we do; applied
oceanography can be of great and growing service
in this regard. But it appears equally certain that as
we move out into the last remaining uninhabited
provinces of the planet, we should proceed with the
greatest restraint, with the greatest respect for what
we do not know.
"We must remain cautious in adopting
tolerance levels as long as our analyses are so
incomplete," Blumer writes. And, he adds, "We
now need to look for a transition to a more realistic
study of nature that acknowledges the limitations
of our present analytical powers and the gaps in our
understanding." William H. MacLeish
Continental
Shelves:
Their Nature and History
Coastlines are of two kinds. There are the peaceful
ones, such as that on which Woods Hole is located,
and there are the unstable coasts, such as that of
Japan or the western side of South America, where
great events are in progress. On or near unstable
coasts there are earthquakes and volcanoes, evidence
that the earth's crust is moving and changing. The
stable kind of coast is called the "Atlantic" type,
the other the "Pacific" type. "Atlantic" coasts are
not confined to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean;
they occur also on the east coast of Africa, on both
sides of India, and all around Antarctica. Similarly
"Pacific" coasts can occur outside the Pacific for
example, around the Carribbean and south of
Indonesia.
That there are two kinds of coast is one of
the primary facts of geography; the importance of
the difference was stressed by the great nineteenth-
century synthesizer of geology, Eduard Suess of
Vienna, and by many people since. It has also been
known for many hundreds of years that off an
"Atlantic" coast the approach to land is heralded by
"coming into soundings," that is, by finding that
the sea floor can be reached by a lead on a sounding
line. This warning was of great practical importance
to the navigators of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, who had no reliable method of finding
their longitude and were in constant danger of
running ashore when the visibility was bad. The
lead not only indicated the approach to shore but
also brought up a small sample of mud, which stuck
to a piece of tallow put into a hole in the lead.
There are many tales of the skill of sea captains and
fishermen in deducing their position from the
appearance, taste, and smell of these samples.
by Sir Edward Bullard
Form
The continental shelf is the undersea platform that
runs along the shores of "Atlantic" coastlines. It
slopes gradually down from the beach to a depth
that varies from place to place, but is usually
between 100 and 200 meters; the slope then
suddenly increases and the sea floor falls rapidly
to depths of 4000 to 5000 meters. The width of
the shelf varies greatly, 100 kilometers being typical.
It is usually remarkably fiat and level, a typical
gradient being 2 in 1000 (0.1)-a slope that a
bicyclist would not notice. At the outer edge the
shelf change in gradient is very sudden and is often
apparent while a ship moves a distance equal to its
own length. The average gradient of the slope
beyond the shelf edge is not very steep (4 is
typical). The whole "scenery" is different from
that on the shelf; there are hillocks, precipices
and gullies, and often great canyons comparable in
width and depth to the Grand Canyon. At a depth
of 2 or 3 kilometers the descent slackens, and at the
foot of the slope there is a more gentle descent to
the deep-ocean floor. This gentler slope is known
as the continental rise.
It is natural to suppose that the shelf is, in
some sense, a continuation of the continent. In
fact it is clear that during the ice age, which ended
about 10,000 years ago, so much water was locked
up in ice sheets and glaciers that sea level was
lowered by 100 meters or so and a large part of the
shelf was dry land. Men hunted the reindeer and
other arctic animals over what is now the floor of
the shelf seas; in western Europe their stone tools and
the engraved antlers of the animals they killed are
still occasionally brought up in trawls. Although the
shelf looks like a piece of continent that has been
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Tile form of the sea floor off the U.S. east coast: the shallow, flat continental shelf: the sudden change of slope at the shelf
edge; and the relatively sharp drop to the deep ocean. (From physiographic diagram of the North Atlantic Ocean,
originally published by the Geological Society ofAmerica. Copyright 1968 by Bruce C. Heezen and Marie Tharp.
Courtesy of Lamont-Doherty Geological Observatory.)
continental shelf
drowned, this does not really say very much about
it; it might be a rubbish tip built out over the ocean
floor, or it might be a piece of continent that has
been planed down below sea level by the waves or
has subsided.
Structure
Serious study of what lay beneath the continental
shelf only started in the mid- 1930s. The first
question was whether the shelf had only a veneer
of recent sediments covering much older rocks or
whether the old rocks sloped down to join the deep-
sea floor and were covered by a great thickness of
relatively recent and poorly consolidated sediment
reaching almost to the surface of the sea. Drilling
onshore in Virginia and elsewhere had suggested
the latter, but only work at sea could show what
was really there.
Such work was started by Maurice Ewing,
then of Lehigh University, at the suggestion of
R. M. Field of Princeton (perhaps the most original
and certainly the most persuasive geologist of his
day). Ewing took the seismic method of geophysical
prospecting to sea. In 1935, using the ketch Atlantis
from Woods Hole Oceanographic, he put instruments
and explosives on the sea floor of the continental
shelf and showed that there was a great thickness of
sediments under the surface of the shelf. In some
places the sediments reached thicknesses of as much
as 7 kilometers and went below the level of the
deep-ocean floor.
This was a great discovery in pure science,
but it has also proved a discovery of tremendous
practical importance. The continental shelf and
slope have an area of over a third of the land area
of the earth and are almost everywhere underlain by
thick sediments. Since sedimentary basins on land
are the places in which oil is found, it was
reasonable to suppose that there would be great
resources hidden beneath the shelves, and so it has
proved. At first the immense technical problems
of prospecting, drilling, and production made
progress slow. Now, with decreasing yields from
U.S. fields and mounting difficulties with foreign
sources, the oil of the shelves looks more and more
attractive.
Development of the technology for finding
and raising oil from beneath the sea has turned the
thoughts of many engineers to other possible
resources, and it is to these and to their attendant
difficulties, as well as to oil, that this issue of
Oceanus is devoted. As a background to the
engineering and political contributions, the rest of
this paper will discuss the way in which the shelves
have reached their present form. The shelf off New
continental slope
continental rise
Cross-section of the continental shelf off the eastern U.S.,
a typical "Atlantic" coast showing several kilometers of
sediments. Vertical scale is exaggerated. (From
"Geosynclines, mountains and continent-building" by
R. S. Diet:. Copyright 1972 by Scientific American.
Inc. All rights reserved.)
England will be taken as an example, but much the
same tilings could be said about the rest of the
"Atlantic" coasts.
History
The continents are composed of rocks of all ages
back to 3800 million years and have a long and
complicated history. The oceans, on the other hand,
contain only relatively young rocks; none, or almost
none, are older than 160 million years, which is only
4 percent of the age of the oldest rocks on land.
The history of the ocean floor is also much simpler
than that of the continents and is probably better
understood, though some land geologists might not
agree. The difference in age between the continents
and the ocean floor is only one of the differences
between land and sea. The hard rocks are different,
mostly granites on land and all basalts at sea; the
mountains at sea are all either volcanoes or blocks
of lava raised by faulting, while on land most
rocks have been formed by the compression and
folding of rocks originally near sea level; and, of
course, the sea floor lies 5 kilometers below the
continents.
The junction of these totally disparate kinds
of geology lies somewhere beneath the shelf, slope,
or rise; and its study is likely to be one of the most
lively parts of oceanography, and, indeed, of earth
science, during the next ten years. The edge of the
shelf is a difficult area to investigate since the
basement is covered not only by water but also by
very thick sediments. The irregularity of the
continental slope complicates the interpretation
of every kind of measurement.
About 200 million years ago the Atlantic
was closed and North America lay against western
Europe and northwest Africa (earlier, 500 million
years ago, there had been an older Atlantic, but
that is another story). Forces whose nature is not
entirely clear produced a crack that started off New
England and ran the whole length of the Atlantic
to the south, and right across the Arctic Ocean to
the north. Naturally the crack was filled with lava
as it formed. A similar process can be seen today
in Africa where a crack, the Rift Valley, has spread
from Abyssinia to Tanzania during the last 20
million years. The crack in the Atlantic was at first
a valley with lakes and volcanoes on its floor, as
is the Kenya rift today; as it widened and lengthened,
the sea got in intermittently, evaporated, and
deposited salt. A present-day analogy may be the
Red Sea, which is connected to the ocean only by
a shallow and narrow channel and which has several
kilometers of salt beneath its floor a sure sign of
isolation in the past.
The Atlantic has been widening for 180
million years. New ocean floor is formed by the
lavas coming out of the crack along the ridge axis,
while the older ocean floor and the continents on
both sides move away to make room for the new
floor. The nature of the events occurring at the
ridge has been beautifully illustrated by Project
FAMOUS, particularly by the photographs taken
from the submersible Alvin (Oceanus, Spring 1975).
For a geological process the motion of separation
is quite rapid. To make an ocean 5000 kilometers
wide in 180 million years requires a motion of 3
centimeters per year; this agrees very well with the
speeds estimated in other ways. In fact the formation
of the Atlantic was not quite as simple as this; there
were several false starts before the final line of break
along the present mid-ocean ridge was established.
One of these abortive splits was between Greenland
and Labrador, another between Scotland and
Rockall Bank; perhaps another is marked by a rift
in the North Sea, which is completely filled with
sediments and is closely followed by a line of major
oil fields.
Clearly, if the Atlantic has been formed in
this way, the eastern and western shores are the
oldest parts, and at the extreme edge we may be
able to find the old rift valley along which the
supercontinent split. Drilling on the shelf off the
east coast of Canada has shown just this. Under
several kilometers of sediments lie old rocks similar
to those found on land in the Maritimes and in
Newfoundland. On the planed-down surface of
these old rocks the first sediments were laid down
on land in lakes and flood plains. Above this come
the marine sediments. The basement is a good deal
broken up and faulted, as is the floor of the Rift
Valley in East Africa.
It is easy to imagine the outline of what
happened, though not so easy to be sure of the
details. The start was probably a doming of the
continent in response to a "hot spot" produced by
the generation of radioactive heat below the crust,
though why it happened when and where it did is
not known. The dome then split and formed a rift
valley floored by continental rocks. Finally the rift
valley itself split, lava came up from below the
earth's crust, and the first strip of the floor of the
new ocean was formed. As the splitting progressed,
sediments from both sides of the valley were carried
into it, gradually forming the great pile of sediments
that we find today beneath the floor of the shelf,
slope, and rise. It lies partly over the floor of the
rift and partly over the outer parts of the floor of
the widening ocean.
Certainly something of this sort happened,
but there are doubtful points and difficulties. Why,
for example, did the continental basement, on which
the sediments rest, sink so far? There are several
possible answers. The dome rose because the rock
beneath it was hot; as it cooled over a hundred
million years or so, the surface sank. The same
thing has happened to the deep-ocean floor. The
mid-ocean ridge is 3 or 4 kilometers shallower than
the ocean on each side; below the ridge the rocks
are hot, as is testified by the volcanoes. As the
plates move away on each side, they cool and
contract and the sea floor sinks. The sinking of the
shelf will be encouraged by the weight of the
sediments. The surface of the basement rocks
beneath the sediments may also be lowered by
stretching and faulting of the crust and by the
erosion of material from the original dome. The
relative importance of these factors is far from clear.
There is one glaring discrepancy between
the shelf and a rift valley. All the existing rift
valleys are much narrower than the depressed
continental blocks under the shelves. For example,
the Kenya rift is 30-50 kilometers wide, whereas
the sunken continental basements off New England
and Morocco are several hundred kilometers wide.
Also there is no evidence in East Africa that there
are any old rocks of the continental basement
beneath the floor of the Kenya rift. There the split
started with enormous outpourings of basalt, as it
did at some places around the Atlantic, and no
trace of the old rocks can be seen. In the Red Sea
the oil wells have not reached the basement, and
it is possible that old continental rocks are present
beneath the much younger sediments; but it is not
certain that they are, and there is some reason to
doubt it. It may be that the process of foundering
of the continental shelf involves long-continued
faulting and sinking and that the width of the
depressed block increases over a long period of
time. This is a plausible notion, but unfortunately
there is no example of an "Atlantic" coast on which
active faulting is in progress on the landward side of
the shelf. There are earthquakes in the eastern U.S.
and western Europe, but they are infrequent, mostly
small, and not distributed in a way that suggests
continued foundering of the continental edge.
The "Pacific" Coasts
Since ocean floor is continuously and rather rapidly
created, there must be a process for disposing
of it. This occurs at the "Pacific" coasts. Here
the plate formed at the mid-ocean ridge dives
down beneath the continent, or sometimes beneath
an island arc, and returns to the interior of the earth
from whence it came. At the place where the plate
subducts there is an ocean deep, and an inclined
plane of earthquakes. Inland, over the place where
the plate is sinking and has reached about 150
kilometers, there is a line of volcanoes fed by the
melting and upward migration of the more easily
fusible parts of the plate. This combination of
descending plate, ocean deep, earthquakes, and
volcanoes is very clear on the west coast of South
America, in Japan, and in many other places. Here
there is no depressed strip of continental rocks, and
there are usually no great rivers to carry sediment
from the land. Instead we find a narrow strip of
tumbled and mixed up material scraped from the
upper surface of the descending plate. Deep water
lies quite close to shore, and there is no continental
shelf of the type known around the Atlantic. If
the plate descends beneath an island arc, there
may be a trap for sediments on the landward side
and great thicknesses may accumulate, as in the
Sea of Japan and to the north of Indonesia.
The countries along the west coast of
South America are unfortunately situated on a
"Pacific" coast and have no real continental shelf.
On the other hand, they have no island arc offshore
and therefore no trap for sediments. This absence
of a real shelf has had its repercussions at the
conferences that have endeavored to negotiate
treaties on the exploitation of the resources of the
sea floor. As some compensation for having no
shelf, the topography and the motions of the water
continent or island arc
ocean basin
behind arc
magmatic belt
volcanoes, intrusions,
and high-Temperature,
low-pressure metamorphism
subduction melanges:
low-temperature,
high -pressure
metamorphism
ocean trench
i i
^^^vtf^^-'^'i
ediments-^/H*^' //.'.-ocean s
Section across an island arc, a typical "Pacific" coast. The
ocean floor descends under the arc, where its melting feeds
the volcanoes of the islands. Vertical scale is exaggerated.
(From Earth by F. Press and R. Siever. W. H. Freeman and
Company. Copyright 1974. After W. R. Dickinson,
"Plate tectonics in geologic history,
"
Science, vol. 1 74,
p. 107. Copyright 1971 by the American Association
for the Advancement of Science.)
off Peru have provided a gigantic upwelling not far
from shore, which supports one of the world's
greatest fisheries (Oceanus, Winter 1975). The
upwelling has also produced immense deposits of
phosphorite, a material of great value as a fertilizer.
Using the Shelves
The continental shelves of the world have an area
equal to 18 percent of the exposed land area, and
the slope and rise to a further 36 percent. It is not
surprising that many nations should be looking to
this considerable area for many things over which
they are having difficulties on land. The biggest
prize would be the finding of oil on the continental
rise and the development of methods for extracting
it. At present it is not known if oil occurs there.
If it is there in the same proportion as on the shelf,
then the immense volume of sediments under the
rise would make it the greatest oil resource for the
future and would change the relations and prospects
of many countries.
Clearly there are almost endless possibilities
of conflict between countries and between groups
with different needs in the same country. It is to
be hoped that the more or less amicable division of
resources in the North Sea may be taken as an
example elsewhere; however, it seems improbable
that the biggest land grab in history will be
conducted entirely peaceably.
Sir Edward Bullard, professor emeritus of Cambridge
University, is a professor ofgeophysics at Scripps
Institution of Oceanography. He was recently Henry L.
Doherty Fellow at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution.
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National Ocean Policy:
Priorities for the Future
.
by Senator Ernest F. Hollings
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Off the coasts of the United States, on the
continental seabed, lie approximately 853 million
acres of the outer continental shelf (OCS). Beyond
that, at depths in excess of 2500 meters, are vast
areas of seabed that remain the common heritage of
all nations. According to current estimates, the
economic potential of offshore resources for the
U.S. will reach $34 billion to $45 billion by the
year 2000 (Table 1 ). These offshore areas are
the last remaining frontiers; how they are managed
can well determine the future of the U.S. This is
not to imply that the ocean can satisfy the basic
needs of society. There have been too many
ridiculous claims to that effect. Nevertheless, it is
vital that the federal and state governments adopt
policies and develop institutions to properly manage
the offshore resources and adjoining coastal zone.
The need for a national ocean policy to
guide the use of offshore resources comes from
another direction as well. While the progress made
at the Third Law of the Sea Conference is
disappointing, there will probably be an accord
reached sometime in the future. If not, or if the
recalcitrance of some nations persists, the U.S.
Congress will move unilaterally toward an extension
of the seaward boundaries to protect offshore
resources. It was not until a similar move by
President Truman in 1945, when, by presidential
proclamation, he extended the national boundaries
to include the 12-mile contiguous zone, that
sufficient international attention was focused on the
issue to permit an agreement at the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Outer Continental Shelf.
The extension of U.S. seaward boundaries,
whether by treaty or statute, will in effect change
the status of property in the affected areas from
the Grotian concept of "common property" to that
of property held in public trust. Implicit in this
shift in legal status is an element of management
control. Just as the OCS is subject to regulation
and leasing by the federal government under the
authority of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
of 1953, so must the extended area be brought under
federal management. It may be in the national
interest to permit foreign development of some of
the marine resources within the U.S. economic zone;
but foreign exploitation must be based on bilateral
or limited multinational arrangements that are in
concert with an overall scheme based on wise
resource management. No longer can the U.S. afford
to use its marine fisheries or seabed resources as
items of international barter in the childlike games
of foreign diplomacy. These resources must be
managed on the basis of scientific principles and
sound management criteria.
Space land is rapidly becoming one of
the most valuable resources of all. This is particularly
true for the coastal zone. Virtually all of the
megalopoli projected for the next century are in the
U.S. coastal states; even now, over 75 percent of the
population lives on the East or West coast. The
pressure from the interior of the country, where
usable land is also at a premium, coupled with the
development of offshore resources, particularly OCS
oil and gas, have the coastal zone caught in-between.
Socioeconomic studies have shown that
population and economic concentrations promote
further growth; conventional wisdom indicates that
the coastal region will continue to grow, both
economically and demographically. But how much
growth can the coastal zone endure without
destroying estuarine productivity and changing the
character of the coastline? It was in part to provide
answers to this question that Congress passed the
Coastal Zone Management Act, but that was in 1972
when the impact of the developing energy crisis on
domestic energy production was not fully recognized.
In final analysis, the concentration of
energy facilities in the coastal zone may turn out
to be the greatest threat to its environment. Power
generating stations are attracted to the region's
population centers and to the ocean as a heat sink
for thermal effluents. There are also proposals for
offshore nuclear power plants, based on the
assumption that remoteness will improve the safety
factor. Deepwater ports, which are now regulated
by the Deepwater Port Act, may proliferate as the
U.S. becomes increasingly more dependent upon
Mideast oil as I am convinced it will. And the new
impetus to accelerate the development of offshore
oil and gas will create additional problems, including
the support facilities refineries, pipelines, service
companies, and living space and services for
personnel that must be provided in the coastal
zone (see page 23).
It is not only the physical presence of these
facilities that coopts space needed for other uses and
contributes further to air and water pollution but
also the secondary growth that results from industrial
activity. We have come to recognize that every
area has a finite carrying capacity beyond which it
deteriorates. Government policy at all levels federal,
regional, state, and local must be sensitive to the
developmental thresholds of the coastal region. In
our zeal to develop the offshore resources, we run
the risk of overlooking the onshore impacts. Now,
more than any other time, we must plan the use of
the marine and coastal resources in unity instead of
striking out hellbent-for-leather, under the
justification of "crisis," to do those things we should
10
have done earlier and more reasonably.
There are at least six critical needs that
must be met in developing a sound marine resource
management program:
-Creation of a 200-mile economic zone,
Reassessment and reorganization of federal ocean
programs,
-Revision of the OCS Lands Act to reflect current
national and regional values,
Strengthening of the Coastal Zone Management
Act to provide the coastal states with a greater
capacity to deal with problems of energy facility
siting,
Establishment of a marine fisheries management
system at the federal level, and
-Federal policy and licensing system for seabed
mining.
Extended Economic Zone
As a matter of practical international politics,
maritime nations want to preserve the freedom of
the seas, while non-maritime countries favor
restricted access to the ocean areas adjacent to their
coasts. As a great maritime power, the U.S. has been
a staunch advocate of freedom of the seas, at least
so far as maritime trade and scientific research are
concerned. After World War II, however, the
country veered from the Grotian doctrine of mare
liberum in its quest for the valuable resources
underlying the OCS. According to Wolfgang
Friedman of Columbia University, an authority on
ocean law, it was the continental shelf doctrine as
implemented by the first Truman Proclamation in
1945 that prompted the international movement
toward the seaward expansion of sovereign
Table 1. Estimated and projected primary economic value of selected ocean resources to the U.S., by
type of activity, 1 972/73-2000, in terms of gross ocean-related outputs (in billions of 1 973 dollars).
Activity 1972 1973 1985 2000
Mineral resources:
IOI7S
Industry and recreation are among the activities that must
compete for space in the coastal zone. (Tom Jones photo)
jurisdiction. Following the lead of the U.S., one
nation after another made territorial claims beyond
the traditional three-mile limit. The developing
nations then had no significant interests in the
distant-ocean resources because of their inability to
exploit them, but they did have considerable interest
in the ocean resources immediately adjacent to their
coasts. Disputes developed-cod, tuna, and lobster
wars-but the continental shelf extension soon
became international custom. Multinational
recognition of the continental shelf doctrine was
formalized at the Geneva Convention in 1 958,
though seaward limits were not defined.
At the time of the convention, the extent
of national jurisdiction was, for all practical purposes,
limited by the technological capability to exploit
the ocean space. The most optimistic futurist could
not have foretold the rapid development of offshore
technology that has taken place since that time.
For example, the offshore industry is now capable
of commercial operations on the sea floor at depths
and under conditions once considered to be
impossible; and foreign fishing fleets can perform
sustained, intensive missions anywhere in the world.
Russian, Japanese, and Korean trawlers and factory
ships off U.S. coasts have had significant impact on
domestic fisheries. The 12-mile contiguous fishery
zone is meaningless as far as scientific fisheries
management is concerned since it in no way
corresponds to the range and habitat of many
important species.
If the U.S. is to protect fisheries resources
and utilize the seabed on the continental slope and
beyond the continental shelf, then an extended
economic zone is imperative. A 200-mile economic
jurisdiction not only would provide the basis for
developing resource management systems, but also
would attract investment and industrial opportunity
considered too speculative under the present
common property system. The question now facing
the nation is not whether to establish an extended
economic zone but rather how to establish it.
Everyone would prefer that the seaward boundaries
be set by an international convention. But in the
absence of accord the U.S. has only three alternatives:
bilateral agreements, limited multilateral
arrangements, or unilateral extension by legislation
or executive proclamation.
Federal Ocean Programs
With the extension of seaward boundaries must
come the organization of the federal establishment
to meet the challenge of administering and enforcing
resource management programs within the 200-mile
zone. In 1969 the Stratton Commission foresaw
the need for a strong civil agency within the federal
government to administer national marine affairs.
The President took an incremental step in this
direction in 1970 with the creation of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
by executive action. But NOAA, which is in the
Department of Commerce, falls short of the agency
proposed by the Stratton Commission.
Under the present federal organization,
notwithstanding the central focus of NOAA, ocean-
related programs are still dispersed among 21
organizations in 1 1 departments or agencies. For
example, parts of the marine fisheries management
program are in the Department of the Interior;
Coast Guard, with its enforcement capability, in the
Department of Transportation; responsibilities for
certain navigational aids and marine safety functions
in the Army Corps of Engineers; regulation of OCS
oil and gas in the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)
of the Department of the Interior; ocean
environmental regulation in the Environmental
Protection Agency; and Maritime Administration in
the Department of Commerce. In short, the federal
government has failed to use oceans as an
integrating theme. So long as marine programs are
considered to be no more than addenda to other
resource programs within the federal government,
the U.S. will be unable to move toward a responsible
ocean policy.
Unfortunately, the government
reorganization schemes that have been proposed
thus far would move in the opposite direction.
Instead of organizing around ocean resources
programs, it has been suggested that marine affairs
become part of a Department of Energy and Natural
Resources (DENR). Such an irrational move would
condemn ocean programs to even lower visibility
and almost ensure their subservience to energy
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and land-based resources. In fact, the creation of a
department that would merge energy with any other
resource be it fresh water, land, environment, or
oceans would assuredly pale the importance of
resource management in the pursuit of an
expedient energy policy. This is the paramount
danger in merging energy plans with other resource
programs.
Those who opt for the creation of an all-
encompassing DENR are also ignoring an important
lesson in government organization that was
ostensibly just learned. The now defunct Atomic
Energy Commission ( AEC) oversaw both
development and regulation of atomic power.
Realizing these responsibilities were at cross-purposes,
the 93rd Congress dismantled AEC and divided these
functions between two new agencies, the Energy
Research and Development Administration, and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. An energy and
resources department would be AEC revisited. No
single administrator is able objectively and efficiently
to implement policies as divergent as are the goals
of energy production, environmental quality, and
natural resources management. A perfect example
of this conflict is presently found in the
administration of the OCS Lands Act for oil and
gas development by the Department of the Interior.
Interior is charged with the responsibility for both
promoting the development of the OCS and
regulating the industry in the development phase.
Mission agencies are tools of the tasks they are
assigned. In the case of Interior, the emphasis has
always been the development or disposal of public
lands, with regulation as a secondary function. OCS
oil and gas development will result by far in a greater
impact to the marine environment and the coastal
zone than any other ocean-related use.
The Senate National Ocean Policy Study
(NOPS), which was created by Senate resolution to
study ocean problems and formulate legislative
solutions, has begun analyzing the federal structure
in light of the future needs for ocean program
organization. The functional elements of marine
activities are presently classified as data collection
and monitoring, management, regulation, or research.
There is little doubt that virtually all of these federal
activities must be upgraded to meet the needs
resulting from expanded national jurisdiction.
Regulation, for all practical purposes, is part of
management. Enforcement and implementation of
a management policy is the key to successful resource
management; therefore, an oceans agency must have
the capability not only to implement policy but also
to regulate and enforce it. Data and information are
necessary components of resource management and
must serve as the basis for policy decisions. Research
is the foundation of future knowledge and must be
matched to the needs of future ocean policy.
NOPS is considering a number of
organizational alternatives, including a Department
of Oceans and the Environment as a prototype for
a cabinet-level office. Merging oceans and
environmental programs into a single agency would
permit mutual reinforcement among complementary
programs. Above all, what is needed is a balanced
approach to energy production and resource
management, achieved by two departments of equal
status: one to develop energy and resources, the
other to protect the environment and manage the
marine and coastal resources.
OCS Oil and Gas
Overshadowing all other ocean resources at the
present time are OCS oil and gas. USGS, in recently
revised figures, estimates that total domestic and
undiscovered recoverable oil resources range between
61 billion and 149 billion barrels of oil.
Approximately one-third to two-thirds of this total
could be in the OCS. Although at the projected
rate of current production this will last only 25 to
50 years, the federal government is relying on these
tenuous resources as the foundation of a short-term
energy policy. National energy plans are predicated
on the assumption of full development of OCS oil
and gas, yet little attention has been given to the
effect that such development may have on the
adjacent coastal zone and the marine resources and
environment of the superjacent waters.
Present OCS policy is based on the
development mentality of the 1950s, when oil was
considered to be an endless resource. There were
indications that we were nearing the end of the rope,
but then, as now, those who proffered such
Tlie greatest threat to the coastal environment may be the
concentration of energy facilities, especially nuclear power
stations. (Tom Jones photo)
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COASTAL ZONE
MANAGEMENT
Tlie Coastal Zone Management Act provides for public
participation in the development of coastal zone programs.
Wise and equitable use of coastal and offshore resources
depends on citizen involvement in the planning process.
(Massachusetts Office of Coastal Zone Management)
foreboding were branded as doomsayers. The OCS
Lands Act and its counterpart, the Submerged Lands
Act of 1953, are not management in nature. Their
original purposes were to partition resources for
disposition by the states and the federal government
at a time when the OCS was considered a source of
wealth, not a means of existence.
There are five major issues concerning OCS
oil and gas development:
Sufficiency of resource information for government
planning and valuation,
Separation of exploration and development of
OCS oil and gas,
Federal-state roles in OCS leasing decisions,
Equitable returns to government and industry for
development of the OCS, and
Compensation to the coastal states for adverse
impacts from OCS development.
Sufficiency of resource information. Under
the present leasing system the Department of the
Interior purchases geophysical information from
independent exploratory companies. Interior may
also participate in "group shots," along with interested
oil companies, to acquire additional information.
Based on such data, the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM), with the assistance of USGS, establishes a
value for the resources. It is not until a lease is sold
and the lessee actually drills exploratory wells that
the presence and extent of the oil and gas can be
verified. A study by the General Accounting Office
showed a low correlation between the government
estimates of the value of oil and gas on the lease
tracts, and the prices bid by industry. BLM has
improved the valuation system since the study, but
there is apparently still room for improvement. The
most caustic critics of Interior's resource valuation
system claim that it is akin to "selling a pig in a
poke." The consequence, they claim, is a reduced
return to the government for the resources. There
are indications, however, that inequities have run
the other way as well; in some cases the government
has received far in excess of the potential value of a
lease.
There is another dimension to resource
information: the need for it at the state and local
levels for the planning and administration of coastal
zone management programs authorized by the
Coastal Zone Management Act. Only after oil is
located and plans for production are developed is
there sufficient information for meeting the impacts
of OCS development. Steps must be taken to
provide the best information possible so that coastal
states can mitigate the impacts resulting from
development of oil and gas off their coasts.
Some people have suggested that the federal
government actively seek oil and gas on the OCS,
including stratigraphic and exploratory drilling. I
sponsored such a measure in the 94th Congress; but
I am now convinced, based on additional study and
information, that the delays necessary to implement
a full exploratory program with the government
would damage the economy and increase U.S.
dependence on foreign resources.
Separation of exploration and development.
Opponents of the current leasing system claim that
once a lease is sold the sequence of events leads
inextricably toward development without sufficient
regard to the effects of production. The present
system requires that the lessee file a development
plan after exploration and prior to production.
Until recently, the plan was almost pro forma and
an environmental impact statement was not prepared,
although on at least one occasion, in the Santa Ynez
field off California, the Department of the Interior
prepared an impact statement to accompany the
development plan through the approval process.
There are two ways to separate development
and exploration: government exploration through
the exploratory drilling phase, and a process that
calls for an independent decision and approval prior
to development. I have already indicated that I
believe the former to be inadvisable, given the
current urgency of the energy problems. The latter,
on the other hand, can be built into the administrative
process so as to require the approval of a production
plan between discovery and development. By
expanding the requirements for a development plan
and coupling it to a two-step environmental impact
statement procedure one before a lease, and an
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updated version prior to approval of the development
plan it is possible to separate the decisions
sufficiently to safeguard against improvident
development where development should not be
allowed. Implicit in such a process is authority on
the part of the Secretary of the Interior, embodied
in the conditions of the lease, to modify, restrict,
or prevent development that may result in undue
damage to the marine environment of the coastal
zone.
Federal-state roles in leasing. The decision
of whether or not to lease on the OCS is wholly
within the discretion of the federal government as
provided through the OCS Lands Act. The states,
however, have a legitimate and real interest in OCS
decisions; they, not the federal government, must
provide for the onshore impacts of offshore
development. The 92nd Congress provided the
states with an effective instrument to deal with
problems in the coastal zone the Coastal Zone
Management Act. Unfortunately, the states' coastal
zone programs, for the most part, will not be
approved before 1976. In the meantime, plans
and procedures to lease in the frontier areas continue.
Congress was sensitive to the problems of
synchronizing federal decisions with the goals of the
states. One provision of the Coastal Zone
Management Act requires that federal actions
affecting the coastal zone be consistent with the
management programs of the coastal states once
they are approved. The ringer is that the so-called
federal consistency requirement does not go into
effect until a state plan is approved. Somehow,
in the OCS leasing process, a means must be found
for considering state goals, policies, and laws prior
to formal approval of coastal zone management
programs.
While it is imperative that the states'
policies and goals be considered in any OCS decision
that would result in onshore impacts, it is not
feasible to give the states veto power or an override
in decisions of such high national priority. To a
large extent, we must depend on the comity between
national and state goals. Communication between
federal agencies and the states is vital to achieving
the national goals through the democratic process.
These lines of communication must be further
strengthened to meet the challenges of offshore
development.
Equitable returns to government and
industry. Although the OCS Lands Act authorizes
two fundamental bidding systems for the sale of
OCS oil and gas-bonus bid with fixed royalty or
production, and royalty based solely on production
virtually all of the lease sales to date have been by
bonus bid. Interior has experimented in a limited
way with royalty bidding, largely at the urging of
the House Appropriations Committee; but the
results, according to Interior, are discouraging.
A bonus bid is essentially a bulk sale; that is, the
entire lot of oil or gas lying below a tract is sold,
and a royalty of 16 2/3 percent of the production
from the tract is levied. As a result of the sale,
huge sums of money are transferred immediately
to the federal treasury. This front-end investment,
while it may or may not be a windfall for either the
government or the lessee, strains the capital capacity
of even the largest oil producers. For this reason
oil companies have often formed joint ventures.
In many ways bonus bidding is nothing
more than high-stake roulette. You win some, you
lose some. Since there is no way of knowing
whether oil or gas is present until exploratory
drilling is done-and that takes place only after
leasing-the bonus bid system has the potential for
producing windfalls for either industry or government,
depending on the amount of oil discovered, if there
is oil at all. One effect of large front-end bonuses is
to force development so that the lessee recovers his
investment as quickly as possible. Another, according
to opponents of bonus bidding, is the tendency of
this system to color subsequent decisions of the
Department of the Interior that must be made prior
to development, and to prevent any cancellation or
repurchase of the lease in the event of even the most
serious environmental consequences.
An advantage of the bonus system is that it
is easy to administer. Once a sale is consummated,
the money is transferred and exploration and
development begin at the initiative and pace
determined by the lessee. The government's role is
minimal beyond sale. I personally believe that the
Department of the Interior has been unduly narrow
in its interpretation of the bidding requirements of
the OCS Lands Act. The language of the act should
permit Interior to utilize combinations and variations
of the bidding systems, the only limit being the
imagination of those administering the program.
Amendments to the OCS Lands Act (S.521)
now being considered by Congress would broaden
the alternative bidding systems available to the
Secretary of the Interior. One innovation, which I
support, would authorize leasing larger areas including
an entire oil-bearing, geologic structure. To avoid the
pitfalls of the bonus system, multiple parties would
bid for variable percentage shares of the lease. The
high bidders (based on their proportional percentage
shares) would form a blind venture. The federal
government would retain a share of the net profits
from the oil and gas production. Front-end bonus
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money would still be involved but would be used
to underwrite up to 50 percent of the costs of
exploration prior to production. The results of an
assessment of this system made by the Office of
Technology Assessment for NOPS were encouraging
and demonstrated the possibility of this approach.
Such a system would tend to solve several
of the problems mentioned earlier: While the lessee
would still do the exploration, the government
would have access to the data because there would
no longer be a reason to maintain the strict
confidentiality demanded by small-tract leasing
under the bonus system; reservation of a net profit
share to the federal government would be more
equitable to all parties; and unitization of production
from the structure would automatically be achieved.
The key, however, is the willingness of the Secretary
of the Interior to experiment with alternative bidding
to arrive at the most equitable system.
Compensation to the coastal states. It has
been shown that OCS oil and gas development has
socioeconomic and environmental effects on the
coastal zone. Associated with these onshore impacts
are both benefits and costs. Since OCS decisions are
solely the responsibility of the federal government,
it is reasonable to assume that the coastal states are
entitled to compensation for any net impacts of
OCS activities. In some cases the states may need
loans to get them through the initial period of
development before tax revenues accrue from OCS
activity, after which benefits may far outdistance
costs. On the other hand, there may be instances
where onshore impacts result in costs for a state
over the entire productive life of a lease.
The question of compensation boils down
to the question of how. There are those who favor
a straight percentage (revenue share) of the proceeds
of the sale of OCS leases with no strings attached.
Others, myself among them, are convinced that
impact money to the states must be tied to a
demonstration of need, and then only to the extent
of net impacts or costs to the states. Whatever the
source and mode of distribution of impact funds-
be they earmarked or appropriated, no-string or
based on net adverse impacts they should be
contingent upon planning and management through
the processes of the Coastal Zone Management Act.
Only through that vehicle can the states meet the
challenge of balancing the multifaceted goals of the
state and the nation as they apply to the coastal zone.
Coastal Zone Management Act
There is now a need to amend the Coastal Zone
Management Act so that the states can give more
attention to the problems of energy facilities siting,
not only to accommodate the impacts of offshore
oil and gas development, but also for other energy
activities, such as power generating stations and
deepwater ports. Energy facilities planning, however,
must be a part of the comprehensive coastal zone
management program and not a separate, fragmented
exercise in expediency. To accomplish a balanced
expansion of the program, more money is needed.
The federal government must also provide guidance
and technical support through studies and analyses
to aid the coastal states in meeting national
requirements while preserving the character and
quality of their coastal environment.
Such goals are exactly the focus of S.586,
which was passed by the Senate July 16, 1975, and
is currently awaiting action by the House of
Representatives. The legislation would strengthen
the federal consistency provision of the Coastal
Zone Management Act as it affects OCS development;
create a Coastal Energy Facility Impact Fund for
planning energy facilities and for compensating states
that suffer net adverse impacts; furnish 90 percent
funding for interstate coordination; fund additional
research and training activities conducted by the
Office of Coastal Zone Management; and provide
funds for public access to beaches and for the
preservation of islands.
Marine Fisheries Management
Expanded jurisdiction in the form of a 200-mile
exclusive fisheries zone would enable the federal
government to assume an active role in U.S.
fisheries management. Presently, the states control
fisheries regulation within the 3-mile territorial sea.
Within the contiguous zone, between 3 and 1 2 miles
offshore, although the federal government has
paramount jurisdiction to regulate fisheries, no
federal regulatory legislation has been enacted.
There are currently in effect 23 international treaties
between the federal government and several foreign
nations regulating marine fisheries.
It is the opinion of many that the
international treaties have been unsuccessful in
conserving fisheries, and as a result several important
fish stocks are being harvested at less than their
optimum yields. A classic example is the U.S.
haddock fishery, which, despite attempts at regulation
by the International Commission for the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries, has been so overfished by foreign
and domestic fleets that the catch decreased from
134 million pounds in 1966 to 2.5 million pounds
in \972(Oceanus. Winter 1975).
Regulation authority to 200 miles offshore
would permit the federal government and the states
to enter into agreements establishing institutional
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structures, perhaps in the form of regional compacts,
for managing fisheries effectively on a broad regional
scale. Because of the migratory nature of fishes, it is
necessary to manage stocks to the extent of their
ranges, which often cross several jurisdictional lines.
Piecemeal regulation based on boundaries conforming
to neither the range nor the habitat of fish stocks
cannot effectually manage fisheries.
Increasing responsibility in fisheries
management would necessitate restructuring the
regulatory agencies involved. The State Department
would have to renegotiate international fishing
treaties based on 200-mile U.S. jurisdiction and, at
the same time, consistent with traditional
international law and principles of the Law of the
Sea Conference (LOS). Such a task would not be
easy, particularly since the U.S. desires to protect
stocks of anadromous fishes, such as salmon, to the
full extent of their ranges, which often include the
high seas.
The role and the capabilities of NOAA's
National Marine Fisheries Service must be expanded
to meet the increased managerial responsibilities that
would come with regulation of domestic fisheries to
200 miles, and also to meet the problems that would
arise as a result of the impact of coastal state
preference of international fisheries management.
A very important aspect of fisheries
management under extended jurisdiction would be
the necessity of compiling and analyzing sufficient
data to be able to allocate fish stocks among the
various domestic and foreign users. Concurrent
with such compilation, analysis, and allocation must
be the capability of constant reappraisal of
management schemes and regulations, and reaction
thereto in a timely manner, since stocks are dynamic
and fluctuate widely over short periods of time.
Without adequate enforcement, fisheries
management schemes are meaningless. Not only
NOAA but other enforcement agencies, such as the
Coast Guard, would have to be expanded to meet
the increased demands of fisheries enforcement.
The 200-mile economic zone would have
a great impact on present concepts of fisheries
management. Current techniques-such as closed
seasons, closed areas, and vessel and gear limitation-
are being used to conserve fish stocks by making
the fishery inefficient. The results are low profits
and marginal operations for the fisheries, and high
prices for the consumers. Also, because the common
property aspects of fisheries allow all who wish to
enter the industry to do so, including many part-
time fishermen (64,000 of 144,000 coastal
fishermen are part-timers), there is much
overcapitalization in the industry.
Jurisdiction to 200 miles would permit the
creation of management schemes, based on the
accumulation and analysis of sufficient data, that
would allocate fish stocks to domestic and foreign
users permitted to participate in the fisheries.
Licensing or limited access into fisheries would also
result in the creation of some form of quasi-property
rights, thereby encouraging rational development of
fisheries resources, leading to increased efficiency
and lower consumer prices.
Thus, in considering the various proposals
for a 200-mile limit and for fisheries management
legislation, Congress is being asked to decide whether
it is desirable to manage and conserve coastal fisheries
resources, whether it is desirable to provide for the
continuation of the domestic coastal commercial and
recreational fishing industries, and whether the
conservation of coastal fisheries resources and the
preservation of the domestic coastal fishing industries
are wise socioeconomic investments.
Seabed Mining
Currently the U.S. is almost wholly dependent upon
imports for manganese, cobalt, and nickel, which are
vital to a number of industrial processes. Concern
for balance of payment problems and the fear of
extortion by foreign cartels controlling scarce
materials have increased the interest in the
ferromanganese nodules on the ocean floor.
Manganese nodules in the Pacific Ocean alone may
contain as much as 358 billion tons of manganese,
5.2 billion tons of cobalt, and 14.7 billion tons of
nickel, as well as large quantities of other minor
metals.
Il is estimated that 4.6 million tons of
ferromanganese nodules may be mined, processed,
and marketed by U.S. firms by 1985. Based on
these estimates and projected demand, the U.S.
could produce nine to ten times its requirements for
pure manganese metal and reduce cobalt and nickel
imports by 70 percent and 20 percent, respectively.
The projected market value of U.S. production of
metals from manganese nodules by 1985 is
estimated at $387 million.
The potential payoff is sufficiently high to
attract the entrepreneur from both foreign and
domestic mining interests. Because of the nature
of the operations, the immense investment needed
to recover and process nodules, and the uncertainty
of the status of seabed minerals vis-a-vis international
law, most companies are joining international
consortia as a ploy to spread risks and reduce
international conflicts.
Distribution of seabed minerals was one
of the most highly contended issues at LOS, pitting
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developed against developing countries. Developing
nations claim an inalienable right to share in the
exploitation of the "common heritage" of the
seabed, although they acknowledge their inability to
mine it. Underlying their concern, however, is the
fear that their market for manganese, cobalt, and
nickel will be diluted, since 77 of the developing
countries are major producers and exporters of these
metals. As a means of distributing seabed wealth,
the "Group of 77," which has now grown to
106 developing countries, supports a strong
regulatory control by the United Nations together
with an international mining organization to mine
the ocean floor. Considering that so-called Third
World countries now control the U.N. General
Assembly, regulation of seabed mining would
virtually be in the hands of the producers. This,
in effect, would be the sanctioning of an
international cartel under the auspices of the
world union.
Primarily through the initiative of private
capital, the U.S. has continued to develop the
necessary technology to exploit the deep seabed.
It is generally agreed that the U.S. is capable of
launching commercial operations by 1980. One of
the best publicized efforts, Summa Corporation's
Glomar Explorer has proved to be an embarrassment
because of its involvement in covert CIA activities
in raising a sunken Soviet submarine from great
depths in the Pacific Ocean. Although the operation
may have prejudiced the U.S. position on freedom
of research on the high seas at LOS, it effectively
demonstrated the capacity to explore and mine the
deep seabed.
The effects of extensive seabed mining and
processing on the marine environment are unknown.
Preliminary studies show little cause for concern.
However, more extensive investigations must be
conducted before the environmental impacts can
be determined.
On the question of whether or not to
proceed unilaterally with deep seabed mining, U.S.
industry maintains that the federal government
should guarantee its investment and protect its
operations from interference in international waters.
Others would establish a unilateral federal leasing-
and-permit system for regulating mining operations.
This would be like selling the Brooklyn Bridge, since
A 200-mile economic zone, with adequate enforcement, would enable management and conservation of U.S. coastal
fisheries and preservation of domestic fishing industries. (Keith von der Hevdt)
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the U.S. government does not own an alienable
property right to the seabed beyond the continental
shelf. As for guaranteeing business investment,
profit is made on the assumption of risk; and those
who stand to profit must include such risks in the
cost of the product. What is needed is a system of
federal licenses to regulate the domestic affairs of
the industry and to establish rules protecting the
marine environment.
Perspectives in Ocean Policy
The U.S. government has consciously promoted the
development of private and public natural resources
through public policies that have provided incentives
for the extraction, harvesting, and conversion of raw
materials to goods, based on the theory one that
is well founded in history that wealth and economic
power must ultimately originate from the earth's
resources. But we are beginning to see that the
cornucopian theories of John Locke and Adam
Smith, at least as they apply to an individual nation
such as the U.S., are riddled with assumptions about
the infiniteness of exploitable resources. Although
some political economists cling tenaciously to the
familiar cliches, this lesson is being learned the
hard way.
There is little doubt that we are entering
the twilight of our productive years so far as
extractable nonrenewable resources are concerned.
We are rapidly slipping down the backside of the
diminishing limb of resource production so
graphically described by King Hubbert with his bell-
shaped curves. Reluctantly we are being forced to
play the politics of scarcity. Now, like many
European and Asian countries, the U.S. must
compete in the world market at inflationary prices
to satisfy its insatiable demands.
The federal government once held two
billion acres of public lands in trust for the people;
but within 1 80 years, through deliberate public
policy, it has disposed of one billion acres of the
most productive public domain. Today there
remains a scant 750 million acres, not including the
OCS, and what remains has a low potential for
meeting the nation's demands.
The challenge to researchers, ocean
industries, and policy makers at the state and federal
levels is awesome. Institutions must be restructured,
policy must be formulated on the basis of sustained
and scientific management of the resource rather
than special interests, and far more knowledge must
be gained in order to bring man's intellect and
innovation to focus on the problems of the oceans.
Ernest F. Mailings, senator from South Carolina (Dem.), is
chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee's National
Ocean Policy Study. He is the acknowledged leader in
Congress on ocean policy and has been instrumental in
formulating legislation on offshore oil and gas development,
coastal zone management, ocean dumping, protection of
marine mammals, and other issues relating to man 's use of
the ocean and coastal resources.
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Selected U.S. Laws Applying tc
Growth of commercial fishing and navigation the
historical uses of the oceans has been joined by
expansion of more recent activities such as minerals
exploitation, dumping, and construction of offshore
terminals and storage depots. Within the next
decade there will be still newer developments-
energy generation in offshore nuclear power plants
and perhaps through more exotic means such as
ocean thermal differences, tidal power, and wind
power; offshore use of industrial-port islands;
expanded mineral extraction; and aquaculture.
Recreation and research are also likely to increase.
One estimate is that the value to the U.S. of its
ocean resources will quintuple, from $7.6 billion
in 1972 to between $34 billion and $44 billion
by the year 2000.
The activities mentioned above take place
on a variety of structures, ranging from drilling ships
to fixed platforms. They are variously called rigs,
industrial vessels, platforms, and artificial islands
and structures.
Growth of applicable regulatory law has
paralleled seaward expansion. Some laws center on a
specific use, for example, continental shelf resources
or offshore deepwater terminals. Others apply to a
variety of activities and regulate areas such as
navigation, labor relations, safety of operations, and
environmental protection. The present jurisdictional
or effective regulatory reach of many laws extends
beyond the nation's territorial seas. The subject is
complicated by the fact that many of the structures
are considered vessels for some, but not all, purposes,
while other structures performing closely similar
tasks are not considered vessels.
Listed below is a selection of U.S. federal
laws pertaining to offshore structures and uses other
than fishing. Some laws, such as the River and
Harbor Act of 1899, are of long standing, although
they continue to play an active role in the regulatory
regime. Others, among them the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act, the Ocean Dumping Act, and the Federal
Water Pollution Control Amendments, were enacted
in the early 1970s. Taken together, they provide
extensive enabling authority to the agencies
responsible for regulating the oceans. Further, much
of the authority found in the more recent acts is
still in the process of being implemented by new
regulations. The laws presented here are discussed
in the report Federal Regulatory Aspects of Offshore
Structures and Uses by J. D. Nyhart of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, scheduled
for publication later this year under NOAA Sea
Grant #04-158-1.
Title 14 USC Coast Guard
14 USC 81 Aids to Navigation Authorized
14 USC 83 Authorized Aids to Maritime Navigation
14 USC 84 Interference with Aids to Navigation
14 USC 85 Aids to Maritime Navigation on Fixed Structures
14 USC 86 Marking of Sunken Vessels and Other
Obstructions
14 USC 88 Saving Life and Property
14 USC 89 Law Enforcement
Title 16 USC Conservation
16USC661-66c
16 USC 1431 et seq.
16 USC 1456 et seq.
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act
Marine Protection, Research and
Sanctuaries Act: Title III
Coastal Zone Management Act of
1972
Title 18 USC Crimes and Criminal Procedure
18 USC 2152 Fortifications, Harbor Defenses, or
Defensive Sea Areas
Title 19 USC Customs Duties
19 USC 1434 Entry of American Vessels
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Offshore Structures and Uses
Title 29 USC Labor
29 USC 655 Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970
Tide 33 USC Navigation and Navigable Waters
33 USC 151-232
33 USC 401 etseq.
33 USC 471
33 USC
33 USC
33 USC
33 USC
472
901 etseq.
1001-15
1051-94
33 USC 1201-08
33 USC 1221-27
33 USC
33 USC
1251-1376
1401-21
33 USC 1501 etseq.
Inland Rules of the Road
River and Harbor Act of 1899
(including Permit Requirements
[403] and Refuse Act [407])
Establishment of Anchorage Grounds
and Regulations Generally
Marking Anchorage Grounds
Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act
Oil Pollution Act of 1961
International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea
(International Rules of the Road)
Vessel Bridge to Bridge
Radiotelephone Act
Ports and Waterways Safety Act of
1972: Title I
Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act of 1972: Title I,
Ocean Dumping Act
Deepwater Port Act of 1974
Title 42 USC The Public Health and Welfare
42 USC 1 857 et seq. Clean Air Act
42 USC 4321 et seq. National Environmental Policy Act
Title 43 USC Public Lands
43 USC 1301 et seq. Submerged Lands Act
43 USC 1331 et seq. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Title 46 USC Shipping
46 USC 1 1 et seq.
(and remainder of
Ch. 2 as applicable)
46 USC 86 et seq.
46 USC 88 et seq.
Registry and Recording (including
71 et seq.: Inspection, Survey and
Measurement)
Load Lines for Vessels Making
Foreign Voyages
Load Lines for Vessels Engaged in
Coastwise Voyages
46 USC 170
46 USC 181 etseq.
46 USC 221
46 USC 222
46 USC 223
46 USC 224
(and remainder of
Ch. 11 as applicable)
46 USC 239(a) (b)
46 USC 361-2, 367,
390b, 391 (b) (d) (e),
391a, 391b, 392(b),
393, 395(b)(c), 397,
399,435,441^5
(i.e.,Ch. Has
applicable)
46 USC 364
46 USC 688
46 USC 701
46 USC 71 3
46 USC 761 etseq.
46 USC 1451 etseq.
Regulation of Carriage of Explosives
or Other Dangerous Articles in
Vessels
Limitation of Liability Act
Vessels of United States and
Officers Defined; Officers to be
Citizens
Complement of Officers and Crew
of Vessels
Minimum Number of Officers
Licensing of Officers
Investigation of Marine Casualties
Inspection of Steam Vessels
(including Tank Vessel Act of 1936,
as amended by Ports and Waterways
Safety Act of 1972: Title II [391a] ,
and Seagoing Barge Act [395])
Vessels Navigating Coastwise
and on Great Lakes
Jones Act
Various Offenses; Penalties
Definitions, Schedules, and Tables
Death on High Seas Act
Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971
(including 146 Id, Negligent Use of
Vessel)
Title 49 USC Transportation
49 USC 1651 et seq. Department of Transportation Act,
amending 18 USC 831-35,
Transportation of Explosives Act
49 USC 1671 et seq. Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of
1964
Title 50 USC War and National Defense; and Appendix
50 USC 191 Magnuson Act of 1950
J. D. Nyhart, associate professor of management, Sloan
School of Management and Department of Ocean
Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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Atlantic Offshore Oil:
The Need for Planning and Regulation
by James M. Friedman
Coastal wetland, York, Maine. (Tom Jones photo)
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In March 1975 the U.S. Supreme Court decided
the case of United States v. Maine. The Court
ruled that the federal government, not the Atlantic
coastal states, has jurisdiction over that portion of
the continental shelf which lies more than three
miles from shore. (In 1953 Congress had granted
to the coastal states title to shelf resources within
three miles of shore.) The case resulted from
Maine's assertion that her jurisdiction extended
two hundred miles to sea. One basis of the argument
was a colonial charter that preceded the founding of
the United States. Eleven other Atlantic states
made similar claims and thus joined in the case.
An important consequence of the Supreme
Court's decision is that Atlantic offshore oil
development will be federally authorized and
regulated. In April, several weeks after Maine, the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) of the U.S.
Department of the Interior took the first step
toward leasing the lands of the outer continental
shelf (OCS) by issuing a call for nominations.
(Outer continental shelf simply means that part
of the shelf beyond state jurisdiction. The term,
as used here, is of legal rather than geological
significance.) When BLM issues a call for
nominations, the oil companies respond by naming
those offshore tracts believed suitable for commercial
development.
The April call was for the section of the Mid-
Atlantic known as the Baltimore Canyon. In June
BLM issued a call for Georges Bank, off the New
England coast. The Interior Department plans to
lease the Baltimore Canyon area sometime in mid-
1976, and Georges Bank later that year.
Not surprisingly, a number of the coastal
states have expressed concern over the potential
consequences of offshore oil development. Even
if the actual drilling takes place one hundred to two
hundred miles from shore, well within federal
jurisdiction, the states will be vitally affected.
Offshore oil exploration must be supported from
onshore bases. And if oil is found, it must be
brought ashore, stored, transported, and refined.
Construction of port facilities, tank farms, and
refineries can have substantial socioeconomic and
environmental effects on a city, small town, or
coastal area.
Certain coastal states are also worried that
oil development may hurt commercial fishing. The
Massachusetts fleet, which is concentrated in New
Bedford and Gloucester, does most of its fishing
on Georges Bank. Oil rigs, platforms, pipelines,
and supply boat traffic are potential obstacles to
trawling.
Another concern is pollution. Oil
companies point out that offshore drilling results
in less pollution than does transportation of oil by
tanker. However, many state officials and
environmentalists still fear the possibility of either
a massive accident, such as a blowout, or the less
spectacular but serious problem of chronic low-
level pollution.
It is evident that offshore oil development
is not without serious costs. The question is
whether those costs can be minimized through
proper planning and government regulation so that,
on balance, development is worthwhile.
Onshore Impacts
Initially much of the debate about offshore oil
focused on pollution. Those opposed to
development argued that the environmental
degradation from oil pollution is simply too high
a price to pay. They could point to the infamous
Santa Barbara blowout of 1969, which fouled the
channel, blackened beaches, and killed an
indeterminate amount of marine life.
Those who supported development asserted
that offshore technology had continually improved,
lessening the chance of another major blowout; and
oil company officials stated that government
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Georges Bank, a primary North Atlantic fishing ground, is scheduled to be leased for oil
development in late 1975.
regulation had become tougher and more
comprehensive since Santa Barbara. Proponents
of drilling pointed out that, above all, we simply
need the oil, and a certain amount of pollution
must be accepted.
The various arguments presented by oil
industry spokesmen, environmentalists, and those
in-between have not resolved the pollution question.
Most important, there is surprisingly little scientific
data on the effects of oil in the marine environment,
and most of what is known has been learned during
the past five years. However, policy makers cannot
assume that a lack of information means that the
damage is minimal or acceptable. Caution is advised,
particularly in siting for development a fishing
ground, such as Georges Bank, that is an important
source of protein for the world.
In recent months the focus of public
discussion has shifted from pollution to onshore
impacts, that is, anything that happens onshore as a
result of oil development offshore. Onshore impacts
can range from increased population and real estate
costs in a coastal village to an oil refinery fifty miles
inland. The emergence of onshore impacts as a
subject for public debate is perhaps due to two
separate events, the first of which was the decision
by the Nixon Administration in 1974 to greatly
accelerate and increase U.S. offshore oil production.
The President's plan called for the leasing of ten
million acres of the OCS in 1975, which would have
doubled in one year the acreage leased over the last
twenty years.
In fact, the ten-million-acre goal will not
be met in 1975. It is doubtful whether the oil
companies could have secured the equipment and
capital necessary for such a sudden and massive
development, even if the government had been
able to properly lease and regulate that many acres.
However, the accelerated program did result in the
Interior Department's decision to hold lease sales
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in areas where no drilling had been done. These
frontier areas included the continental shelves of the
Atlantic and the Gulf of Alaska.
Local response in the frontier areas has
varied. Offshore oil can mean a much needed
boost to a local or regional economy. On the other
hand, development can place serious strains on a
social structure, or cause environmental damage.
These conflicts were particularly felt by state
officials in New England, where the economy has
been hard hit in recent years. A refinery or port
facility might be welcomed in parts of New England.
But the region possesses traditional villages and a
remarkable coastline. If these features were harmed
by oil development. New England's sense of identity
would be offended. Moreover, the vital tourist
trade could be affected.
The second event to focus public attention
on the topic of onshore impacts was the
development of North Sea oil off the coasts of
Scotland and Norway. During the past two years,
several studies of Scotland have been published.
The National Ocean Policy Study of the U.S. Senate
Commerce Committee issued a report in October
1974; the Council on Environmental Quality
sponsored similar research; and early in 1975 the
Conservation Foundation published Pamela and
Malcolm Baldwin's book, Onshore Planning for
Offshore Oil: Lessons from Scotland. These
studies, and others like them, give meaning to the
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phrase onshore impact. The picture that emerges is
worth noting in some detail.
The first phase of offshore oil development
is exploration. After years of seismic study to
locate geologically promising structures, oil
companies and their contractors begin drilling with
mobile rigs to determine whether there are commercial
quantities of oil in a particular area. This activity is
supported by onshore bases from which supplies
are transported by boat to the rigs. The nearest
harbor town therefore serves as a depot, with the
possibility of increased congestion and competition
for docking space.
During exploration there is usually little
development onshore, aside from the supply bases.
An exception occurs when drilling rigs are constructed
in coastal communities adjacent to the offshore
exploration. This did not happen in Scotland
because most rigs were imported from the Gulf of
Mexico, but Norway converted a depressed
shipbuilding industry to rig construction.
If commercial amounts of oil are found to
exist, development begins. It is at this point that
onshore impacts are most intense. Logistical support
must be provided for platform and pipeline
construction. Tank farms and refineries must be
sited and built. Contractors and service industries
move into the towns that will serve as support bases
for the offshore operations. All of this activity can
put a severe strain on local planning. If the
construction of oil-related facilities means new jobs
and a general boost to the economy, it can also mean
higher land prices, increased rents, and greater
burdens on public services. A new refinery, for
example, requires three to four million gallons of
water per day. Onshore impacts are likely to be
more severe in smaller towns or rural areas than in
cities. But wherever coastal impacts are expected to
occur, planning is a necessity.
Once the development phase has been
completed and the oil fields are producing,
employment opportunities usually decline. The
Baldwins point out that while 2000 people are
needed to build a refinery, it takes only 300 people
to operate it. And, of course, many of these
positions are not filled by local people. The threat
of a boom-bust economy is a serious problem. To
avoid such an occurrence Norway has established
a national policy of gradual rather than rapid
development of its North Sea oil.
While the North Sea experience is of
obvious value in attempting to assess the effects of
offshore development, it is especially relevant to
New England. The North Sea and the North
Atlantic around Georges Bank have similar climates
and sea conditions. Both Scotland and New England
support domestic fishing industries. And, perhaps
most importantly, Scotland had no large domestic
petroleum industry prior to the North Sea
development; the industry had to come from outside
the country. Similarly, New England has no major
petroleum industry (there is currently no large
refinery in the region); if Georges Bank is to be
developed, the industry must come from outside the
region. New England and Scotland are in contrast
to the situation in the Gulf of Mexico, where nearly
all U.S. offshore oil development has taken place.
In the gulf the oil industry did not come from
somewhere else; it merely moved offshore from
the states of Louisiana and Texas.
In predicting the onshore impacts in New
England, one can place too much reliance on the
Scottish experience. Oil and gas development in the
North Sea is one of the largest in the world, and
geologists do not believe that Georges Bank will
provide as rich a find. If there is less oil in Georges
Bank than in the North Sea, onshore impacts will
naturally be less in New England than they have
been in Scotland.
To predict the degree and the locations of
onshore impacts in New England is a hazardous task.
The region's geography and the local political
attitudes are likely to affect the course of
development as much as does the amount of oil
found offshore. The Narragansett Bay area, Cape
Cod, and the offshore islands of Martha's Vineyard
and Nantucket seem geographically well suited to
support oil operations on Georges Bank. Of these,
Narragansett Bay may be the most amenable: the
waterway provides sufficiently deep approaches for
supply boats, barges, and small tankers; and large
parcels of land (former Navy bases) are open at
Newport and Quonset Point. In contrast, Cape Cod
and the Islands have smaller harbors and few large
blocks of available land. Nevertheless, it cannot be
concluded that Narragansett Bay will be the site
of support facilities, because geography will not be
the sole determinant of where onshore impacts
will occur.
From a national perspective there is a
tendency to assume that New Englanders are of
one mind about oil development. However, even a
brief examination of the various state governments
suggests substantial differences in the way the New
England states approach offshore oil. In Maine, for
example, legislation in recent years has suggested that
the state is determined to protect the beauty of its
coastline and the vitality of its fisheries. The oil
pollution control law states:
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The legislature of Maine finds and declares that the
highest and best uses of the seacoast of the state are
as a source of public and private recreation and
solace from the pressures of an industrialized society
and as a source of public use and private commerce
in fishing, lobstering, and gathering other marine life.
Although Maine's coastline is separated
from Georges Bank by the Gulf of Maine, state
officials are concerned about the ways in which
offshore oil development will affect the state. If
the ports are too far away from Georges Bank to
serve as a supply base, there could be more
proposals for siting refineries. This and other
questions about offshore development will be
addressed by a special OCS Advisory Committee
recently appointed by the governor.
In New Hampshire, where the governor is
a strong proponent of offshore oil development,
state law provides that before a refinery can be built
in a particular town, the town must approve the
project by referendum. It is therefore difficult to
predict the course of onshore development in
New Hampshire.
Massachusetts towns also have substantial
legal power and thus have much to say about
onshore impacts. However, a bill is now before the
state legislature to make refinery siting a state
decision.
^Methil
Kirkcaldy & Burntisland
Onshore developments in Scotland. (Northeast Scotland Development Authority)
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Aberdeen and Peterhead harbors host Britain s major supply
bases for North Sea oil (see map, page 27). These bases
provide berthage for supply vessels that carry equipment
and provisions to offshore oil rigs and platforms, as well as
warehouses, repair facilities, and office buildings. (Top)
Peterhead Bay, with derrick barge, floating oil rig, and
supply boats. (Center) Truckload of oil pipeline is delivered
to a supply base in Peterhead. (Bottom) Supply boat All
Tide leaves Aberdeen Harbor. (Top photo: diaries Fraser;
center and bottom photos: Richard Allen)
In Rhode Island the state commission in
charge of economic development has taken
advertisements in oil industry trade journals
announcing that the state would welcome the
industry's use of the abandoned Navy bases.
However, Rhode Island also has a coastal zone
commission that must ultimately approve petroleum
facilities on the shoreline.
In Connecticut the Coastal Area Management
Office (CAM) in the Department of Environmental
Protection is developing a coastal zone plan.
Currently, primary responsibility for the siting of
petroleum facilities remains with the towns. A CAM
spokesman reported that it is too soon to predict
whether the coastal zone plan will result in a
stronger state role.
These differences in state attitudes and
law are not academic distinctions. In assessing where
an oil company may locate a refinery, tank farm, or
supply base, the nature of state regulation is a prime
variable. An oil company might choose one state
over another simply because it sees less regulation
and litigation there. Admittedly, geographical
constraints remain.
Given the variety of impacts of offshore
oil development, government regulation is increasing.
And despite the complaints of some oil companies,
this regulation seems necessary if there is to be
proper onshore planning. However, state regulation
is only part of the scheme; the federal government
retains primary responsibility for offshore oil.
In recent months the federal administration
of OCS development has been subject to serious
criticism. State officials as well as congressional
committees have charged that the Interior
Department has done an inadequate job of planning
and regulation. Understanding the current debate
over offshore oil policy requires a basic knowledge
of the legal-administrative structure for offshore
development.
Federal-State Relations
In 1953 Congress enacted the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, establishing the basic administrative
framework for offshore oil development. The act
vested administrative authority in the Secretary of
the Interior, who has delegated this authority to
two agencies of the Interior Department: the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which leases
offshore tracts to the oil companies; and the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS), which regulates offshore
operations after a lease is signed.
No doubt a basic purpose of the OCS
Lands Act was to increase federal revenues from
offshore oil production. This purpose was in
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keeping with BLM's traditional role of facilitating
the exploitation of natural resources by private
corporations. Since the passage of the act, American
attitudes toward natural resources and the
environment have changed. Although few people
would deny U.S. need for oil, this need is no longer
sufficient justification for the exploitation of
natural resources without proper planning and
regulation.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Congress
enacted laws that expressed a new public awareness
of the environmental costs of unplanned
development and industrialization. There were
anti-pollution laws, such as the Clean Air Act of
1970 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
of 1972, and planning statutes, such as the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1972.
This legislation was designed to regulate
not only the public but also the government. The
National Environmental Policy Act, for example,
requires that all federal agencies file an
environmental impact statement before taking
any action that will significantly affect the
environment. The statement must include:
an assessment of adverse environmental effects of
the proposed action; alternatives to the proposed
action; a statement of the relationship between
the proposed short-term use of the environment
and the long-term effects on the environment; and
a statement of any irreversible commitment of
national resources resulting from the proposed
action. The purpose of these bulky requirements is
to make the government more sensitive to the
environmental consequences of its policies.
In October 1974 BLM issued a draft
environmental impact statement for the accelerated
offshore leasing program. Pursuant to the
requirements of the National Environmental Policy
Act, there were public hearings on the draft statement.
The East Coast meeting was held at Trenton, New
Jersey, in February 1975; and while the ostensible
purpose was to gather public comment on the impact
statement, discussion went considerably further.
Oil company representatives accused the coastal
states, particularly those in New England, of delaying
offshore development (U.S. v. Maine had already set
back the leasing schedule). Industry spokesmen also
suggested that the New England states were being
selfish, that they were placing their environmental
concerns above the national need for energy.
In responding to these accusations, coastal
state officials and others criticized the impact
statement as being superficial, without useful
scientific data or analysis. (Anyone who has waded
into the statement's sluggish prose would find it
hard to disagree with this charge.) Witnesses from
the coastal states asserted that BLM was little
concerned with proper planning and was ignoring
the states in developing its program. Finally, local
officials and members of citizens groups from the
Northeast maintained that they were not being
selfish in opposing BLM's methods of doing business.
Their argument was not with oil development per se,
but with a poorly planned and administered offshore
program that was not part of a well-thought-out
national energy policy.
Regardless of how one views the various
criticisms, the point is that BLM and the coastal
states are not working together in planning for
Atlantic offshore oil development. Since many of
the impacts will fall within state jurisdictions, even
though the drilling will take place on the federal
OCS, a lack of state-federal coordination could
cripple oil development and result in unnecessary
environmental and socioeconomic damage.
There is nothing in the OCS Lands Act that
requires the Interior Department to work closely
with the coastal states in planning the offshore
leasing program. However, the Coastal Zone
Management Act emphasizes a strong state role in
planning for all matters affecting coastal areas and
mandates federal-state cooperation. It states that
"the key to more effective protection and use of the
land and water resources of the coastal zone is to
encourage the states to exercise their full authority
over the land and waters in the coastal zone." As
an incentive, the Office of Coastal Zone Management,
which administers the program, makes federal funds
available to any state that will develop a
comprehensive plan for its coastal zone. To prepare
such a plan, or management program, a state must
carry out baseline studies of its coastal resources,
designate areas of particular fragility or concern,
define permissible land and water uses, and develop
the political structures necessary to implement its
program.
Clearly, the Interior Department cannot
properly plan for offshore development unless it
consults with the coastal states. A state might allow
a tank farm at one place on its shoreline, but not at
another. The Interior Department should have
such information before granting a federal right-of-
way permit for a pipeline. Similarly, the states, in
making their planning decisions, should be aware
of the special problems of the offshore developer
and the Interior Department. Perhaps a pipeline
can be routed ashore only at several points because
of the bottom sediments of a particular portion of
the continental shelf.
29
-<^*.~
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Section 307 of the Coastal Zone
Management Act requires that no federal license or
permit be granted for any activity affecting a state's
coastal zone unless the state has certified that the
activity is consistent with its management program.
Thus the act seems to require that federal agencies
recognize state planning needs. At the present
time, however, Section 307 is not in force because
no coastal state has yet implemented its final plan.
The work of gathering and analyzing substantial
scientific and socioeconomic data has taken longer
than the developmental period envisioned in the
act. Also, the Nixon Administration delayed the
states at the outset by impounding coastal zone funds.
When a state has completed its management
plan, the program must be approved by the Secretary
of Commerce if the state is to maintain its federal
funding. The secretary grants or withholds approval
on the basis of criteria presented in the statute, one
of which is that the state's plan must provide for
"adequate consideration of the national interest
involved in the siting of facilities necessary to meet
requirements which are other than local in nature."
The secretary could use this clause to invalidate a
program that makes no provisions for energy-related
facilities.
Although there is room for federal and
state officials to argue about what cooperation
means and who must compromise, the Coastal Zone
Management Act is a significant addition to the
administrative legal-framework for offshore oil
development. It provides a concrete mechanism in
Section 307 for coordinating federal and state
programs, and it recognizes that the protection of
coastal resources, such as wetlands and estuaries, is
best achieved through strong local and state
participation.
In sum, current planning for offshore oil
development is hampered by poor federal-state
relations. BLM has relied too heavily on oil
company opinion and expertise a practice that has
made many of the coastal states suspicious of the
agency. Opening the planning process to the states
and the public would not only lessen suspicion of
BLM but also make the agency a better manager.
The primary responsibility for regulating
offshore oil operations rests with the USGS
Conservation Division, although other federal
agencies such as the Army Corps of Engineers and
the Coast Guard are peripherally involved. USGS
issues a variety of regulations called OCS Orders,
which cover, among other things, safety (well easings
and blowout preventers), plugging and abandonment
of wells, pollution control, and drilling procedures.
The quality of offshore drilling operations is therefore
greatly dependent upon how well USGS does its job.
In recent years USGS, like BLM, has been
severely criticized. On October 1, 1974, the House
Committee on Government Operations issued a
report, based on a Government Accounting Office
study, concluding that USGS inspection procedures
were inadequate. According to the GAO, only half
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of the fifty wells started in fiscal year 1972 were
inspected for compliance with pollution and safety
regulations during drilling operations. The House
report cited additional statistical evidence of lax
enforcement.
Other congressional committees, including
the House Small Business Committee, have found
fault with USGS. At the heart of much of this
criticism is a belief that the agency has been
"captured" by the oil industry it regulates. Of
course, this idea is not new; federal agencies are
often charged with representing the interests of the
industries they regulate rather than of the public.
However, the Interior Department seems particularly
prone to this argument.
Another reason for criticism of USGS is
that the agency considers information on seismic
work and exploratory drilling to be "proprietary."
The oil companies argue that since they lease an
offshore tract before doing any exploratory drilling,
they are entitled to keep the USGS data secret.
Otherwise, competing firms will use the information
to assess the value of adjacent tracts that have not
been leased. While the argument makes good sense
to the companies, it also makes planning extremely
difficult. Without information on the potential size
of an offshore field, coastal zone commissions
cannot adequately prepare for onshore development.
In recent months both BLM and USGS
have made some attempts to involve more people
in planning and regulation. USGS representatives
met with New England fishermen to discuss how
oil and fishing operations could be made more
compatible. BLM has stated that it will listen to
discussion on which offshore tracts should not be
nominated because of environmental hazards or
conflicts with other industries, such as commercial
fishing. Of course, BLM has made it clear that it
will not be bound by such "negative nominations."
While these attempts to involve more
people in the formulation of offshore policy are
to be commended, they emphasize how isolated
the Interior Department has been. USGS still does
not hold public hearings in preparing its regulations.
And BLM still acts more like a private real estate
agent than as manager of the public's natural resources.
The purpose of planning is not to hinder
development of natural resources but to minimize
environmental and socioeconomic damage. The
federal agency in charge of offshore oil development
should be suspicious of neither planning nor the
public.
James M. Friedman, an attorney, is currently a postdoctoral
scholar in the Marine Policy and Ocean Management
Program, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution.
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Marine
Sand and Gravel
Mining
by Michael J. Cruickshank and Harold D. Hess
The 30,000-ton "hydro-barge" Ezra Sensibar, an ocean-going suction hopper dredge designed for sand and gravel mining.
It is self-loading and self-unloading, carries a crew of eleven, and can dig in water depths to about 30 meters.
(Construction Aggregates Corp., Chicago)
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Sands and gravels account for the greatest volume of
non-energy minerals mined annually in the United
States. Production from all sources in 1974
amounted to about 904 million tons valued at
$1.6 billion, involving about 5600 commercial
operations. Based on Bureau of Mines statistics,
tonnages produced in the U.S. represent about
13-14 percent of world production.
The major use of sand and gravel is in the
construction industry, which utilizes about
95 percent of the supply: highway construction and
maintenance, including concrete and asphalt paving
mixes for bridges, tunnels, and road bases, account
for 56 percent of the total; building construction
and maintenance, including urban renewal and
metropolitan transit systems, 39 percent. The
remaining 5 percent is used for abrasive products,
foundry and glass sand, railroad ballast, and
miscellaneous industrial items.
Because sand and gravel is a low-cost,
high-bulk commodity, making the price very
sensitive to transportation costs, markets have
traditionally been established before a local source
of raw materials has been sought. Under this
system cost to the consumer has remained fairly
stable over the years. Now, however, prices are
beginning to rise as a result of the increased costs of
labor, land, and reclamation, in addition to the need
to produce from lower-quality or more-distant
deposits as the better ones become depleted or are
enveloped by urban expansion.
The influence of these variables is
demonstrated further by the range of prices charged
at different locales. According to the Bureau of
Mines, representative carload prices of sand in 19
cities in 1972 ranged from $1.05 per ton in Detroit
to $5.40 per ton in Pittsburgh, with an average of
$3.14 per ton. The cost of 3/4-to-l-inch gravels
ranged from $1 .60 per ton in Birmingham to $7.00
per ton in New Orleans, with an average of $2.80
per ton. The average price F.O.B. plant for all U.S.
sand and gravel production combined was $1 .31 per
ton (Pajalich, 1973). These variations largely reflect
transportation costs, which in most cases limit the
distance the commodity can be carried to a market
and still be economical. In California, for example,
this distance is roughly 65-80 kilometers, and in
Oregon less than 32 kilometers. As 'a general rule,
the prices of sand and gravel double for each
32-40 kilometers by truck.
Compared with other forms of land-based
mining, sand and gravel mining represents close to
10 percent of the value of all U.S. minerals
production, excluding energy minerals. During the
20-year period 1952-72, production of sand and
gravel increased at a rate of almost 5.5 percent per
year and is expected to grow at the average rate of
about 3.9 to 4.7 percent per year through the year
2000 (USBM, 1970). This reflects an annual demand
by the end of the century of between three and
four times the present production. We must
therefore find new sources that are economically
competitive to mine and transport, and whose
utilization has minimal impact on the environment.
An alternative source that is beginning to
receive serious attention in the U.S. is the submerged
lands of the continental margin, including the
coastal zone and the outer continental shelf.
Obviously, with the joint requirements for markets
and competitive prices, coastal or near-shore deposits
will not be the answer to shortages in mid-continent.
However, the location of large urban centers near
the coasts and the anticipated increase of future
construction needs in the coastal zone make the
possibilities for an enlarged marine sand and gravel
industry not only attractive but also compelling.
At the present time in the U.S., operations are
extremely limited and restricted to a few locations,
such as coastal estuaries and inland waters. Although
industry interest in many offshore areas has been
high, public protest has led to dredging moratoria in
most coastal states. In many cases the restraint
results from a lack of information on environmental
effects, for neither the nature of the resources nor
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the magnitude of the impacts has yet been
determined. Nevertheless, some understanding of
these areas can be reached in the light of U.S. and
foreign activities.
The marine sand and gravel industry of the
United Kingdom, for example, is the largest and
most advanced marine mining activity in the world
today. It supplies about 20 million tons per year of
concrete aggregate for construction purposes in the
U.K. and on the European continent. In addition
to U.K. operations, Denmark dredges approximately
1 million tons of sand per year from the Baltic Sea
for building purposes in Scandinavia. The Dutch
recover about 10 million tons of sand per year for
land reclamation from North Sea sources far off
the Netherlands coast (Hess, 1971). Japan also has
an active sand and gravel industry offshore, supplying
about 19 percent of the country's needs, though
mostly from sheltered waters. In France, government-
sponsored exploration has been completed with a
view to utilizing offshore reserves in the English
Channel and in the Bay of Biscay.
Costs
Reported costs from Europe and the U.S. indicate
that marine aggregates would be competitive with
those from land. Table 1, based on U.K. dredge
operations in 1970, shows capital costs of between
80^ and $2.68 per ton of annual production
capacity and operating costs, including capital pay
back of between 35^ and 49i per ton. By
comparison, product value for inland sand and
gravel delivered to the Los Angeles Harbor area in
1968 was $2.69 per ton and is expected to exceed
$6.00 per ton by 1980.
Sand and Gravel Resources
Apparent resources of sand and gravel have been
tentatively estimated for the U.S. and the world,
both onshore and offshore, and compared with
projected demands (Table 2). According to these
estimates, economic land sources of sand and gravel
for the U.S. and the world would be depleted by
the year 2000, if the present rate of increase of
usage is maintained. Additional marine resources
of sand and gravel on the continental margins are
indicated, which would increase the resource base
by a factor of 25 for the U.S. and 93 for the world.
As yet, there is no way to substantiate these very
impressive numbers because the resources have
been mapped in only a few areas, such as the
northeastern U.S. (Figure 1) and parts of Europe
(Figures 2 and 3); and even there, the depths of
the deposits have not been adequately mapped.
However, it appears from these beginnings that
there are significant deposits of commercially usable
materials off most coastlines throughout the world.
Sand and gravel is certainly the most
prolific of the industrial mineral deposits on the
U.S. continental margin. Its occurrence has been
recorded in most areas of medium- to high-energy
environments, and for the East Coast it is well
described in the literature (e.g., Campbell et al.,
1970). Estimates of sand and gravel resources,
based on sampling and seismic profiling, have been
made for selected areas of the U.S. continental
margin (Table 3). Nearly 500 billion tons have been
indicated for the Atlantic Coast alone, with a ratio
of about 15 to 1, sand to gravel. These figures have
been projected to include all U.S. coastal regions
Table 1. Examples of capital investment and 1970 operating costs for five
marine sand and gravel mining operations in the North Sea.
Table 2. Apparent resources of marine sand and
gravel compared with apparent land resources and
cumulative demands to the year 2000. The units
represent gross market values in 1972 dollars and
do not indicate economic reserves.
Present annual demand3
Cumulative demand to A.D. 2000a
Apparent land resources
a
Apparent marine resources
$ Billions (197 2)
U.S. World
1.02 7.45
76.7 535.0
67 333
1690b 31,000
C
*U.S. Bureau of Mines, 1970.
b
Cruickshank, 1974a.
c
Cruickshank, 1974b.
(Table 4), taking into account the differing
characteristics of the margins, and indicate apparent
resources of up to 1400 billion tons. These estimates
are gross and do not take into account the economic
factors associated with the supply of materials to
the market. For example, deposits are at varying
distances from urban centers and in areas of very
different environmental conditions. Such factors
are the basis of benefit/cost studies, required to
determine the minability of a deposit, that include
characterization and economic evaluation of the
deposit, determination of mining methods and
costs, and analysis of environmental impacts and
costs (Cruickshank, 1974b).
Nature and Occurrence
Marine sands and gravels resemble those from land
in most characteristics. Their petrologic nature
depends on their source, from which they may have
been transported by glacial or river action, currents,
winds, or wave action along coastlines. The
calcareous sands made up of shell material from
marine organisms are generally used as a source of
lime rather than for construction purposes. Common
impurities in marine deposits vary with their location
and may include salt and shells, and in certain coastal
areas such organic materials as sewage, dead fish,
seaweed, coal, and tarballs. Washing removes the
salt; the other impurities, though not a major
problem, can be eliminated by a variety of methods.
Sand covers most of the U.S. Atlantic and
Pacific continental shelves, except in the northern
latitudes around the Gulf of Maine-Georges Bank
area and parts of the far northern Washington
continental margins, where reworked Pleistocene
gravels of continental origin are also abundant.
The largest gravel deposits along the Atlantic Coast
occur off Nova Scotia and Massachusetts, the latter
near Nantucket Shoals on federal land (Figure 1);
and along the Pacific Coast, seaward of Cape
Flattery and southward to the Hoh River area.
Gravels in these northern latitudes are of superior
quality for the construction industry because they
are continental gravels of granitic and metamorphic
origin that were introduced by Pleistocene glaciers
invading these areas from the north. Gravel deposits
also occur in the southern latitudes, but they are
generally not as widespread and are commonly more
intermixed with sand. Mixed sand and gravel
deposits, showing little evidence of segregation, are
most common off U.S. coasts, particularly in the
southernmost latitudes.
Mining Methods
Sand and gravel has been traditionally mined
underwater by two basic methods, one of which
employs a stationary, or anchored, dredge that digs
a pit; and the other of which utilizes a transient
dredge that skims off the top layer of material as
the vessel moves along. The choice of method
depends on such variables as extent, thickness, and
composition of the deposit; sand-to-gravel ratio;
type and depth of overburden,* if any; location
with respect to shore facilities; and prevailing
weather and sea conditions.
Dredges most commonly used in sand and
gravel operations are straight suction hopper or
clamshell dredges in the stationary mode, and
trailing suction hopper dredges in the transient
mode (Figures 4-6). Submerged booster jets may
increase the depth capability of the suction dredges
in depths below 30 meters. Other types of dredges
that may be used in special circumstances are the
dipper, dragline, bucket ladder (Figure 7), and
cutterhead suction. For the most part these work
in a semi-fixed position where they can cut into
a bank while moving progressively forward by means
of anchor lines or walking spuds. Dredged materials
are normally fed into a pipeline or a hopper barge
moored alongside.
The need for sand and gravel for marine-
related construction has resulted in occasional
contract-type operations to supply the material
from marine sources, and this type of demand is
likely to increase as the coastal zone becomes more
important to industrial development interests and
public land management agencies. There are many
instances of beach replenishment for recreation and
to combat erosion; of the construction of artificial
islands for land extension, utilities, mine shaft sites,
and other industrial purposes; of the construction of
*Unwanted material overlying the deposit; usually muds,
silts, or clays.
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Figure 1. Distribution ofsand and gravel on the continental margin off the northeastern U.S. (From Geological Survey
professional paper 529H, 1970: modified by F. T. Manheim)
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Figure 2. Marine sand and gravel map of the U.K. showing sources of sea-dredged material, prospect areas, and discharge
points. (Hess, 1971)
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Figure 3. Status of knowledge of the distribution of
marine aggregates on the French continental margin in
1974. (CNEXO and ISTPM Research Program, Paris)
harbors and breakwaters; and of the fabrication of
massive concrete structures for use at sea.
A classic example is the construction of
Treasure Island in San Francisco Bay as a site for
the Golden Gate Exposition before World War II
(Scheffauer, 1954). The area to be reclaimed was
about 400 acres, in water depths ranging from less
than 1 meter to 8 meters maximum at low water
(Figure 8). The gross quantity of fill required was
just over 22 million cubic meters. Of the total,
1 million cubic meters was procured by hopper
dredges and dumped directly into the deeper parts
of the shoal area. Another 5.6 million cubic meters
was dredged by the same means and deposited in
deep basins where it was stockpiled for dumping
onto the fill area by pipeline dredges. Borrow areas
were selected close to the site. Five hopper dredges
were used on the project to bring coarse sands and
gravel for the perimeter and foundations of the
construction, while the major part of the internal
fill consisting of finer materials was emplaced by
stationary pipeline dredges.
More recent experimental work by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers has shown that large
offshore accumulations of sand can be used in beach
nourishment. A detailed experiment conducted off
the New Jersey coast at Sea Girt in 1966, and
reported by David Duane (1968) of the U.S. Army
Coastal Engineering Research Center, proved the
feasibility of utilizing offshore deposits for beach
replenishment through the use of a sea-going hopper
dredge with pump-out capabilities (Mauriello, 1967).
In this experiment the Corps' Goethah dredged and
pumped ashore about 200,000 cubic meters of sand
in 13 working days. Mining a deposit in
approximately 13 meters of water with a distance
of 2.4 kilometers from source to offshore pipeline
terminus, the vessel pumped sand to the beach
through a 600-meter-long submerged pipeline. This
experiment showed that operations could continue
until swells exceeded approximately 2 meters in
height. Data indicated that the sand was emplaced
at a reasonable unit cost and could be a competitive
source in certain areas, assuming that program
operations and costs remained similar.
Environmental Problems
It is important in discussing environmental problems
to distinguish between maintenance dredging, which
involves the removal of obstructions from waterways,
and production dredging, in which sand and gravel
are produced as a marketable commodity. Open-
water disposal of material from maintenance dredging
in the U.S. alone amounts to some 200 million
cubic meters each year (Boyd et al., 1972).
Because much of this material is very fine-grained
muds and silts, and a great deal of it (particularly
from ports, harbors, and industrial areas) is
contaminated, the environmental problems are
quite significant. In contrast, production dredging
does not require the disposal of waste materials to
any great extent, and most deposits are found in
areas of coarser-grained and nontoxic bottom
materials.
Potential environmental problems from
production activities at sea are of three general
types: alteration of the shape of the sea floor,
interference with other users of the area, and
disturbance of marine ecosystems. The present use
of trailing suction hopper dredges causes a general
lowering of the seabed over the area of the deposit
to a maximum of about 5 meters, depending on the
number of traverses made, the physical character
of the material, and the corresponding slope
stability. The width of a single dredged trail by
itself is usually not more than 2 meters, and its
depth less than 1 meter. Stationary dredges as
presently used, mostly for sand, leave a hole in the
seabed up to 20 meters deep and 75 meters in
diameter, depending on the depth of deposit, the
quantity mined, and the character of the material.
In both instances there is a release of fine-grained
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Table 3. Resources of sand and gravel in selected areas of the U.S.
continental terrace as estimated by various workers.
Location Quantity estimated
New Jersey
Connecticut
Rhode Island
Massachusetts
Maine
Florida coast
East Coast, total
New Jersey (gravel)
New England (sand)
New England (gravel)
California, Russian River
California, Redondo Beach
California, total
Alaska, southeast
Hawaii, Oahu
3043 million cubic yards
3
1 30 million cubic yards
3
141 million cubic yards
3
1 37 million cubic yards
3
1 23 million cubic yards
3
600 million cubic yards
3
41 74 million cubic yards'
1
10-30 billion cubic yards
b
450 billion metric tons
31 billion metric tons c
100 million metric tons
5 million metric tons 6
"Considerably less than Atlantic"
1*
"Large quantities'
370 million metric tons
^Duane, 1969.
b
McKelvey et al., 1969.
^Manheim, 1972.
Marine Minerals Technology Center, Tiburon, Calif., unpublished data.
^Fisher, 1969.
Campbell et al., 1970.
Table 4. Estimated regional resources of sand and gravel on the U.S. continental terrace.
Location Area
(km' 0)
Resources
(metric tons x 10
6
)
Basis for estimate
Hawaii
Figure 4. Suction hopper dredge Cambrook working in a
stationary mode in the River names estuary. Over 2000
tons capacity, the vessel is one of the largest of the U.K.
fleet. (Skyfotos, Hythe, England)
maricultural nursery grounds.
The potential impact of marine mining on
ecosystems is the least-known area of environmental
concern and, without doubt, the most difficult one
to assess. For the most part, effects are secondary
and due to some alteration in the existing physical,
chemical, or trophic equilibrium. Impacts on the
coastal zone tend to be more significant than those
on the outer continental shelf because of the higher
physical and biological energy levels generally
recorded there and the proximity to population
centers. Physical changes that may induce biological
effects include variations in temperature, current
patterns, amount of suspended particulates present,
nature of the sea floor and substrate, and light
penetration and photosynthesis; and the introduction
of new habitats. Significant chemical changes may
be those in the presence of nutrients, trace elements,
or toxics. Possible trophic changes include removal
of or influence on existing species by involving them
in the dredging operation. In general, alterations in
temperature and chemistry are unlikely and would
normally occur only as a result of induced changes
in current patterns near shore, where local
temperature and chemical gradients were very
significant because of natural or man-induced
conditions.
Criteria on which to judge pollution or
significant environmental change are often arbitrary
and, where they are given, may err on the side of
safety, based mostly on the assumption that no
change is the preferred state. This assumption is
open to argument, and much more data are required
before generalizations can be made-if, in fact, they
can ever be made for such a varied and dynamic
environment (Clark, 1974). Standards established
or proposed by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency for coastal waters include quantitative
criteria for temperature, oxygen, and pathogens
and toxic substances; and qualitative criteria for
circulation, turbidity, sedimentation, habitat,
salinity, nutrients, fauna, and productivity. The
assessment of these items for any mining area or
operation necessitates considerable field study and
experience. Effects of operations on living marine
resources can be judged beneficial, insignificant, or
adverse. To date, some beneficial effects have been
recorded or discussed, such as the attraction of fish
to offshore structures, the enhancement of substrate
habitats and biomass productivity by alteration of
the texture of the seabed, the enhancement of
substrate habitats by the presentation of new
surface nutrients by mixing and replacement of the
seabed material, thermal stimulation of plant and
animal growth, introduction of nutrients by mixing
of water masses, and enhancement of phytoplankton
growth by increasing turbidity in ultraclear waters.
The list of potentially adverse effects is
much longer. For example, the direct effects of
pollutants on individual organisms include abnormal
growth, decreased productivity, behavioral changes,
accumulation effects in the trophic chain,
restriction of motor functions, erosion of gill
filaments, suffocation by burial, retardation of
metabolic efficiency in filter-feeding animals,
pressure shock, embolism, and thermal shock.
Changes in diversity and abundance and other
secondary effects on the community and ecosystem
structures may be caused by disruption of food
webs, changes in predator-prey relationships,
reduced community stability in response to
Figure 5. Trailing suction hopper dredge Yolanda underway
while dredging sand and gravel in the North Sea. Tlie
vessel is almost fully loaded. (Skyfotos, Hythe, England)
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Figure 6. Ocean-going clamshell, or grab bucket, dredge
Landguard at work in U.K. waters. Tin's type is used
mostly for harbor clearance but also may dig for gravel.
(Skyfotos. Hythe, England)
environmental fluctuations, changes in age structure
of populations by selective mortality, changes in
dynamic behavioral patterns, concentration of
toxic fractions through food chain transfers, loss of
bottom habitat, provision of new habitat, migration
of population, and introduction of dormant species
from bottom to surface waters.
Analyses of the potential impacts require
a knowledge of the undisturbed populations and
their natural cycles so that changes can be predicted,
verified, and controlled. At the present time there
is little agreement within the scientific community
about what constitutes an adequate knowledge of
pre-operating conditions or baselines. Difficulties
arise in the selection of indicator species that will
adequately represent the biotic community and its
reaction to the disturbances. The idea of measuring
baselines is still so new that the effect on local
biological communities of long-term regional cycles,
for which there are no data, may be overlooked or
unsuspected. Conversely, the effect of local impacts
on regional or global communities may be
underestimated or overestimated with no chance of
immediate verification or disproof.
From the foregoing considerations it can
be generally concluded that potential disturbances
from marine sand and gravel mining operations are
dependent on both the mining method and the
environmental conditions of the area. Apart from
some broad guidelines, conclusions on potential
impacts should be operation- and site-specific.
Most physical and chemical changes can be measured,
but assessing the effects of biological perturbations
requires intensive and long-term study.
Future Operations
Although most U.S. coastal states have moratoria
on sand and gravel mining or similar activities in
the coastal zone, there is every indication that
selected deposits on the outer continental shelf
(OCS), under the jurisdiction of the federal
government, will be developed in the near future
under some form of prototype leasing that will
allow for extensive environmental monitoring and
control during the operation.
Active interest in offshore sand and gravel
leasing has already been demonstrated by a number
of U.S. companies; and several foreign groups having
long-established sand and gravel sea-dredging
capabilities are actively working toward sand and
gravel operations off the U.S., presumably through
arrangements with U.S. producers. Following
implementation of a federal hard minerals leasing
program, it is estimated that annual sand and gravel
production from the OCS could reach 1 2 million
short tons or more within the first five years.
Estimates of sand and gravel operations assume
average annual production rates of 1 million to
2.5 million short tons per project. In the first year,
with one operation, annual production would be
between 1 million and 2 million short tons; in the
fifth year, with 8-10 operations, annual production
would be from 12 million to 25 million short tons.
Sizable operations on the OCS would
probably be near the larger metropolitan areas on
the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, where accessible land
reserves are fast approaching depletion and where
the greatest demand and correspondingly high
prices are found. The most promising shelf areas,
Figure 7. Sea-going bucket ladder dredge St. Alban,
operated by the U.K. Ministry of the Environment for the
Royal Navy. Tliough commonly used for Iwrbor work,
where digging is difficult, this type is also employed in
dredging sand and gravel or corals in other parts of the
world. (Skyfotos, Hythe, England]
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Figure 8. Golden Gate Exposition site in San Francisco Bay showing borrow areas for the 400-acre island, which
is now part of the Treasure Island Naval Base. (Scheffauer, 1 954)
based on known offshore resource potential,
proximity to markets, and industry interest, are
shown in Figure 9. They include:
-New England southward to Virginia: Sand and
gravel deposits will be used principally to supply
the large metropolitan areas of New York, Boston,
Washington, D.C., and Norfolk with aggregate for
building and road construction. Small quantities
may also be used for beach replenishment.
-Florida Atlantic Coast: Extensive deposits of sand
have been delineated. Primary use will be for
beach replenishment in the larger recreation
centers, especially the Miami-Ft. Lauderdale area.
-California: Southern California offshore could
provide large amounts of sand and gravel to meet
increasing market demands in that area. Land-
based sand and gravel operations are being pressed
farther and farther away from the market,
particularly in the Greater Los Angeles metropolitan
area. Demand around Los Angeles Harbor alone
is about 22 million tons per year. Extensive
deposits of sand and gravel also occur off the San
Francisco Bay area and could supply a ready
market.
Significant sand and gravel deposits also
exist in waters within the 3-mile state-jurisdictional
limit of the 50 coastal states. Many of these likewise
are close to the larger metropolitan markets and
offer potential resources when state moratoria are
lifted.
Research Needs
Some major areas for research are suggested by the
need for resource conservation and environmental
management. To conserve sand and gravel resources,
it is essential that the deposits be characterized and
well delineated over broad areas so that mining can
be controlled in systematic fashion The ratios of
sand to gravel vary widely in different areas, and by
utilizing those deposits most suited to user needs
at any given time, the mining and related discard
of unsuitable material by shipboard or shoreside
processing can be reduced. For example, the
normal ratio of sand to gravel mined in the North
Sea is about 70 to 30, while the ideal dredge material
in the London area is considered to be 40 percent
sand and 60 percent gravel. In lease areas where an
operator cannot achieve such a ratio, shipboard
screening is often employed, with recovery of up
to 100 percent gravel and over-the-side discharge
of sand. In some cases construction specifications
for sand or gravel content may be unnecessarily
rigid, leading to discard of otherwise usable material.
When the availability of deposits is known, it may
be expedient to match them to projected needs
and mine them selectively.
In order to carry out this type of detailed
delineation on the scale required, advances are
needed in exploration tools and methods, particularly
those of bottom and sub-bottom profiling. It would
be very useful, for example, to be able to determine
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the quantity of sand and gravel in a deposit by
remote methods (even present techniques of
exploratory drilling are not well developed), and it
seems that major advances will entail the adaptation
of automated systems to the mapping and control
of mining operations (Figures 10 and 1 1). Onshore
the automation of plants for product control and
the elimination of dust, noise, and water pollution
are problems common to all sand and gravel
producers, not just marine operators. However,
the contamination of wash water with salt is unique
to marine production and must be prevented in
those areas where fresh water is scarce, or where the
brackish effluent could have undesirable effects.
Knowing the location and extent of the
deposits and thus being able to control the mining
operations will help to minimize the possibility of
upsetting the balance of physical processes in the
mining area. However, much research remains
to be done on the secondary effects of sea-floor
excavations. Reliable data on the rate of natural
filling of excavated pits or the replenishment rates
of shifting or unstable sands are rare. Many before-
and-after studies and long-term monitoring programs
are required to develop reliable models for the
prediction of such effects. As discussed earlier,
the needs for ecological research are many.
Continual monitoring of the local areas
will be required. Such programs have been proposed
in the past, for example, the New England Offshore
Mining Environmental Study, planned and initiated
by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. This study was designed to develop
baselines and to monitor a mining operation for sand
and gravel in Boston Harbor. Although the actual
operation was to have taken only three months, the
program (which unfortunately was aborted due
largely to local political problems) was to have
covered a period of several years. One important
aspect of such research is the development of
standards for the acquisition and reporting of data.
Much additional agreement is required among
environmental institutions, on both a national and
an international basis, so that comparable data can
be used elsewhere.
Figure 9. Known distribution ofpromising areas for marine sand and gravel mining in the OCS areas of the continental U.S.
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Figure 1 0. Analog record from a sector-scan sonar operating
in 14 meters of water in the North Sea, showing a pit left
by a stationary suction dredge. Dimensions of these pits
may vary up to 20 meters in depth and 75 meters in
diameter, depending on the amount of material removed
and the stability of the sea floor. (U.K. Natural
Environmental Research Council, Unit of Coastal
Sedimentation)
Figure 11. Analog recorder from a sector-scan sonar
operating in 14 meters of water in the North Sea, showing
tracks left on the sea floor by trailing suction dredges. The
tracks are about 1 meter wide and one-half meter deep.
(U.K. Natural Environmental Research Council, Unit of
Coastal Sedimentation)
J. R. Thompson, in an excellent review of
the ecological effects of offshore dredging and beach
nourishment for the U.S. Army Coastal Engineering
Research Center, cites certain areas where knowledge
is lacking; among these are substrate characteristics,
nutrient and other chemical exchanges with the
overlying water, and population inventories, with
particular regard to life cycles and corresponding
habitats. Also discussed are material and energy
cycles within the existing ecosystems, mathematical
models for the coordination and interpretation
of data and the prediction of change, and the
relationship of cultural (non-natural) systems to
the whole.
It may be concluded that mining for sand
and gravel on U.S. continental margins is a near-
future development of some importance to the
industry and the consumer. Current operations
indicate that the adverse environmental effects,
even if uncontrolled, tend to be more damaging
to the physical features of the coastal zone and to
the resource base itself than to the ecology. Much
research is required, however, to confirm these
indications. If supported by adequate information
about the deposit and its environment, sound
resource management practices could prevent, or
at least minimize, the damaging effects of mining
operations.
Michael J. Cruickshank is staff mining engineer and
Harold D. Hess is staffgeologist with the US. Geological
Survey, Conservation Division, Western Region. They are
concerned with the development and planning of Division
responsibilities for hard minerals lease management and
resource evaluation under the OCS Lands Act of 1953.
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Oil Ports
on the
Continental Shelf
by John R Flory
Although the United States has declared a goal of
reducing oil imports, most authorities believe
imports will have to increase above present levels to
replace decreasing domestic production and to meet
growing energy demands. The use of very large
tankers in conjunction with offshore oil ports can
reduce environmental risks and lower the cost of oil
imports. Of the various types of ports proposed, the
deepwater terminal with single point moorings is
considered to be the most attractive. The recently
developed single anchor leg mooring is the type of
single point mooring that will be used for at least
some of these terminals.
U.S. Oil Import Needs
In 1970 the U.S. imported 3.4 million barrels of
oil per day, most of this by pipeline from Canada or
by medium-sized tankers from Venezuela. Since that
time production of crude oil within the U.S. has
declined while consumption has increased.
According to a recent estimate of U.S. oil needs and
supply, 6.3 million barrels of oil per day will be
imported in 1975 (Figure 1). Though future trends
will depend, in part, on conservation efforts and on
the cost and availability of foreign oil, imports at the
rate of 10 million to 12 million barrels per day are
presently predicted for the 1980s. Approximately
3 million barrels per day of refined products are
included in these estimates. Therefore, importation
of crude oil is expected to increase from about
3 million to approximately 8 million barrels per day
within the next 10 years.
The task of developing tankers and
terminals to handle this rapid increase in oil imports
is compounded by the need to transport the oil over
much greater distances. Canada has already decreased
its exports to the U.S. and has served notice it will
discontinue exports by 1982 to conserve its
petroleum resources for domestic needs. And
production in Venezuela is declining. It will
therefore be necessary to transport most of the
increase in imported oil from Africa and the Middle
East, over distances approximately three to seven
times as far as Venezuela. More oil carried greater
distances will necessitate a considerably larger
capacity in the tanker fleet.
Developments in Tankers and Oil Ports
Means of enlarging tanker capacity while at the same
time decreasing transportation cost and pollution
risks have evolved over the past fifteen years to
meet the gradually increasing oil import requirements
of Europe and Japan. Before 1960 tankers of
30,000 to 75,000 dead weight tonnage (dwt)* were
typical in international service. Beginning in the
early 1960s, larger tankers were constructed to
carry crude from the Middle East to Europe and
Japan. Prior to 1967 maximum tanker size was
limited by the dimensions of the Suez Canal, by
depths in established ports, and by shipyard
technology. Tankers planned in 1966 were typically
100,000-200,000 dwt with drafts of less than
19 meters, to allow them to pass, at least in ballast,
through the Suez Canal at depths then projected
for its dredging program. They were also the largest
vessels that could serve most deepwater ports in
Europe and Japan at the time.
The closing of the Suez Canal in 1967 both
eliminated one of the principal considerations in
tanker designs and dramatically increased the need
for more and larger tankers to carry crude the much
longer distances between the Middle East and
Europe. Tankers between 250,000 and 300,000 dwt
became common, and some as large as 500,000 dwt
were ordered. Those larger than 175,000 dwt have
come to be known as Very Large Crude Carriers
(VLCCs). The growth of tanker size since World
War II is shown in Figure 2.
Outside the U.S., terminals kept pace with
the growth in tanker size. At crude oil loading ports
*Dead weight tonnage is a measure of the total carrying
capacity expressed in long tons.
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Figure 1. U.S. oil needs and oil supply, 1960-90. (From
Energy Outlook 1975-1990, published by Exxon)
in the Middle East, piers and sea islands (piers
connected to shore only by a pipeline) were built in
deeper water. Some European ports were dredged
to greater depths or were expanded seaward, and
several new ports were created. In Japan larger
conventional terminals were built in sheltered
harbors, and special moorings were built offshore to
serve VLCCs.
Several techniques were developed to better
utilize VLCCs. Special transshipping terminals were
constructed in Ireland, Japan, and the Caribbean to
offload oil from VLCCs to storage facilities onshore,
then to reload the oil onto smaller tankers for
distribution to shallower ports in the region. Also,
methods were devised to bring smaller tankers
alongside VLCCs at sea and to transfer crude oil to
the smaller vessels (lightering), which carried it to
smaller ports. The VLCCs with drafts reduced by
lightering or by discharging part of their cargo at
one terminal (two porting) could then enter
shallower ports.
The most versatile and widely adopted
method developed to accommodate VLCCs is the
single point mooring (SPM), which consists of a
single buoy or tower structure at which the tanker
is moored by its bow. Since its introduction in 1959,
over 130 SPMs have been installed throughout the
world, many to handle VLCCs. The locations of all
SPMs in operation in 1974 are indicated in Figure 3.
Sixteen are in Japan; none are in the United States.
Oil Terminal Alternatives
Oil terminals must be safe and environmentally
sound as well as economical to build and operate.
A number of alternative types of terminals have
been proposed and studied by the federal
government, universities, oil companies, and other
groups.
The use of VLCCs could substantially
reduce the number of tankers entering U.S. waters.
This, in turn, would decrease the risk of tanker
accidents and resultant oil pollution, as discussed
later. The use of VLCCs would also lower the cost
of transporting oil to the U.S.; crude hauled from
the Middle East to the U.S. in VLCCs would cost
approximately 40 cents per barrel less than that
carried the same distance in tankers under
70,000 dwt.
VLCCs can be used in conjunction with
transshipment terminals, several of which exist or
are planned in Canada, the Bahamas, and the
Caribbean. With this method, the U.S. would not
have to build terminals for VLCCs. However,
transshipping to smaller tankers instead of carrying
the crude directly to the U.S. in VLCCs adds
approximately 10 cents per barrel to the cost of the
crude. Furthermore, transshipment does not reduce
the number of tankers calling at U.S. ports as
compared with the case of carrying the oil all the
way in smaller tankers. Transshipment requires
transferring the crude oil four times instead of twice,
thus increasing chances of pollution.
Tankers with a draft deeper than 14 meters
cannot use existing terminals on the U.S. East and
Gulf coasts, which effectively excludes tankers
larger than about 75,000 dwt. Since VLCCs draw
18-28 meters of water, they cannot be fully utilized
until new or better terminals are provided. Extensive
and expensive dredging would be required to enable
existing ports on the East and Gulf coasts to accept
VLCCs. Only northern Maine, Long Island Sound,
and Delaware Bay provide the deep, protected waters
suitable for conventional piers capable of berthing
VLCCs. However, proposals to use these sites as
1945
160 m
1955 50.000 dwt
225m
1965
200.000 dwt
1975
500,000 dwt
Figure 2. Growth of tanker size since World War II.
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Figure 3. SPMs in operation in 1974.
tanker terminals have drawn opposition from local
and state governments. No such natural harbors
exist between Delaware and Mexico.
If the use of the few natural deep harbors
or the dredging of other harbors is ruled out, then
VLCC ports must be placed offshore in sufficient
water depths. For the largest VLCCs, this means
about 30 meters. Distances from shore to sufficient
water depths range from about 5 kilometers in some
parts of New England to more than 60 kilometers
off the Carolinas, and from almost 1 5 kilometers
near Gulfport to over 80 kilometers near Lake
Charles and some areas of Florida.
An offshore island which would consist
of a breakwater for a conventional pier and which
would support storage tanks, possibly a refinery,
and maybe bulk-cargo terminals and other facilities-
would be a very expensive alternative (see page 57).
The dredging required to create such an island could
cause extensive environmental damage, and its
presence would significantly alter the environment.
If an artificial island were used for a refinery with
associated product movement, or if other shipping
or industry were placed on the island, the
concentration of traffic and the risk of marine
accidents would be increased.
Sea islands and multiple-buoy berths have
been used for years offshore in relatively sheltered
areas to moor tankers. At these facilities tankers are
moored at a fixed heading and can remain there so
long as the waves, winds, and currents are moderate
and approximately in line with the longitudinal
centerline of the berth. Tankers can remain moored
in waves up to 5.5 meters maximum wave height*
from ahead or astern, but only in waves of about
2 meters from abeam; and they cannot enter or
leave such facilities in waves higher than about
2.5 meters. Because of these limitations on service,
multiple-buoy berths and sea islands are not practical
for VLCCs in exposed locations. The offshore sites
available for VLCC ports along the U.S. East and
Gulf coasts are too exposed and subject to severe
waves, winds, and currents to make multiple-buoy
berths or sea islands viable.
A number of studies, both government and
private, have concluded that the SPM is the most
practical and most desirable type of berth for East
Coast and Gulf Coast VLCC ports. The SPM is
suitable for open-sea conditions because it allows
the tanker to swing and head into the winds, waves,
and currents. Thus, mooring forces are minimized,
and tankers may remain safely moored in more
severe environments. SPMs are generally designed
to allow tankers to remain moored in waves of
8.5 meters maximum wave height, and some have
been designed for over 1 1 .5 meters maximum wave
height. Extensive experience has been gained in
designing and operating SPMs in other parts of the
world: installation requires little or no dredging and
constitutes a minimum modification of the
environment, and there is very little risk of accident
during maneuvering. Reduced operational downtime
and ability of the vessel to get underway without
*Maximum wave height, used throughout this article, is
approximately 1.9 times significant wave height, a
statistical average of the highest one-third waves.
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tug assistance are other advantages of an SPM over a
pier or sea island.
Environmental Impact
It is frequently assumed that tanker terminal
operations are a major source of marine pollution
because such activities are highly visible and because
tanker accidents receive wide publicity. Actually,
terminal operations cause less than 1 .5 percent of all
petroleum pollution in the oceans (Figure 4). All
tanker activities result in less than 30 percent of the
pollution, and half of this is from non-LOT (load-on-
top) sources. Load-on-top, in which oil tank
washings are retained inside the vessel, is practiced
on most VLCCs. Nevertheless, tanker and terminal
operations do contribute to ocean pollution, and
every effort is being made to limit this source of
pollution.
Operating experience has shown that VLCCs
are less likely to be involved in accidents than are
smaller tankers. The safety record of VLCCs is
partly a result of the fact that they usually berth
offshore or in special areas near the mouths of
harbors where they are less likely to be involved
in the groundings and collisions related to congested
harbors. The safety record is also due to the fact
that they are better equipped than most older,
smaller tankers.
The U.S. Coast Guard study for the Council
on Environmental Quality concluded that VLCCs
offshore production
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other
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accidents
5.1%
other vessel
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and bunkering
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Figure 4. Sources ofpetroleum pollution in the oceans. (Porricelli and Keith, 1 9 74)
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used in conjunction with deepwater ports would
reduce both the number and the volume of oil spills
by a factor of 10 as compared with transshipping.
Data compiled by the Coast Guard indicated that
during the period 1969-72, nearly 70 percent of
collisions and groundings the principal causes of
major oil spills were in harbors and harbor
entrances. If offshore ports are not built, tanker
traffic to existing harbors will approximately triple
during the next 10 years.
The safety record of the SPM deepwater
oil ports is impressive. Approximately 125 SPMs
are in operation throughout the world, some of
which have been in service for more than 10 years.
The average oil spill rate at SPM discharge terminals
has been less than 1 barrel for every 1 million
barrels handled.
An oil spill at an offshore port is less likely
to cause damage than if it had occurred in a harbor.
The Coast Guard acknowledges this in defining a
major oil spill as 240 barrels in a harbor but
10 times this amount offshore. The Department of
the Interior's Deepwater Ports Study shows that if
spill containment and cleanup are not undertaken,
the probability of an oil spill off the East Coast
reaching shore is reduced by a factor of 5 if the spill
originates 25 kilometers or more from shore as
compared with a spill originating within 8 kilometers
of shore. The farther a spill must drift before it
reaches shore, the greater opportunity there is for
spill containment and cleanup. Also, there is more
evaporation and dispersion of the toxic portion of
the crude oil before it reaches shore.
Pipelines connecting an offshore port to
shore can also be expected to have an outstanding
safety record. Such pipelines would be buried, thus
eliminating the possibility of damage by anchors
dragging or similar accidents. Statistics for buried
pipelines on the continental shelf indicate a
32-kilometer-long pipeline could be expected to
spill about 0.1 barrel per 1 million barrels handled.
Single Point Moorings
The first type of SPM, known as the Catenary
Anchor Leg Mooring (CALM), was developed
simultaneously and independently by Shell Oil
Company and IMODCO, then a Swedish company
but now a U.S. company based in Los Angeles. Shell
installed a number of CALMs in the Far East in the
early 1 960s through contracts with IHC, a Netherlands
shipbuilding company. IHC became a licensee of
the Shell CALM and through a subsidiary, SBM of
Monaco, has supplied over half of the CALMs in
the world today. IMODCO developed CALMs for
the Swedish and German navies, then became a
major supplier to oil companies; the company also
has furnished a number of CALMs for the U.S.
Armed Forces in the Far East and for handling
fluidized iron ore and liquid propane. Figure 5
shows a CALM operated by Exxon at Singapore.
A CALM consists of a large fiat buoy,
approximately 10-12 meters in diameter and
3-5 meters high, that is anchored by four or more
chains extending in catenaries to anchor points on
the sea floor, sometimes as far as 400 meters from
the buoy (Figure 6). The tanker is moored by bow
hawsers to a turntable on the deck of the buoy.
Floating loading hose connects through piping on
this turntable to a fluid swivel in the center of the
buoy. Underbuoy hoses connect this swivel with a
manifold at the end of the submarine pipeline.
Another type of SPM consists of a fixed
mooring tower with a mooring turntable on its
deck. The first such mooring tower was installed by
an Exxon affiliate in Libya in 1963 (Figure 7).
As shown in Figure 8, the tower features an
underwater loading arm extending from the
turntable to a riser positioned beside the tanker's
midship manifold. Several mooring towers that
employ floating loading hoses have been installed
in Italy.
In the mid-1960s, an Exxon Research and
Engineering study concluded that new concepts
would be needed to moor and load the very large
tankers then contemplated for the 1970s. A major
research program, initiated in 1966, developed the
Single Anchor Leg Mooring (SALM) to meet these
needs.
The SALM consists of a mooring buoy at
the sea surface, which is attached to a base on the
sea floor by a single anchor leg (Figure 9). The
buoy is drawn down against its buoyancy by tension
in the anchor leg. Tankers moor through lines to
the buoy, and a swivel in the anchor leg or on the
buoy allows the tanker to swing around the mooring
point. A fluid swivel is mounted concentric about
the anchor leg, either on top of the base or on top
of a riser pivoted from the base and forming part of
the anchor leg. Cargo hoses connect to an arm on the
fluid swivel and rise to the surface, where they float
and extend to the tanker manifold.
Development of the SALM
Extensive model-tests were conducted on the SALM
in a variety of wind, wave, and current environments
to determine the effects of parameters such as buoy
size and shape, depth of water, length of anchor leg
and mooring lines, and tanker size on mooring
performance. From the results of these tests,
methods were developed to design the mooring
system and to predict mooring loads.
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Figure 5. CALM at Exxon's Singapore refinery.
At the same time, studies of structural and
mechanical arrangements were underway. Fluid
swivel joints, as large as 1 .2 meters in diameter, and
a high-load-capacity anchor chain swivel, all with
corrosion-resistant seals, were developed through
contracts with manufacturers. A giant universal joint
structure was designed as a pivot for the riser
required in deepwater installations. The very large
anchor swivel, 152-millimeter anchor chain, and
universal joint used to moor a SALM buoy are
shown in Figure 10.
The first SALM was installed by Exxon's
Libyan affiliate at Brega in 1969. Set in 43 meters
of water, it was designed to moor tankers as large
as 300,000 dwt in seas up to 8.5 meters maximum
wave height, and to load crude oil through a single
hose 0.6 meter in diameter at a rate of 50,000 barrels
per hour. This prototype has operated with
minimum maintenance and no major problems.
The Brega SALM (Figure 9) has a large
steel base approximately 19.5 meters in diameter,
filled with sand to resist uplift and held by piles to
prevent sliding. The lower section of the anchor leg
is a pipe connected to the base by a large universal
joint. At the top of the riser is a load-carrying shaft
surrounded by a rotatable fluid swivel unit. The
mooring buoy, approximately 4.9 meters in diameter
and 7.6 meters high, is attached to the top of the
shaft by a short length of anchor chain. Tankers are
moored by synthetic ropes attached to brackets on
the deck of the buoy. Crude oil passes through the
riser to the fluid swivel unit, then through the hose
to the tanker manifold.
A second SALM was installed at Okinawa
in 1971 (Figure 1 1 ). This system differs from the
Brega SALM in that the fluid swivel unit with center
shaft is mounted directly on the mooring base. The
riser is unnecessary in the 27-meter water depth at
bow hawser
rotating turntable
mooring buoy
floating loading hose
rotating buoy manifold
anchor piles
\
Figure 6. CALM system.
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Figure 7. SPM tower at Brega, Libya.
the site. Two hoses, each 0.6 meter in diameter,
were installed on the Okinawa SALM to accommodate
a design flow rate of 75,000 barrels per hour. A
tanker moored to the Okinawa SALM is shown in
Figure 12.
Another SALM was installed in 1974 at a
production field in the South China Sea
approximately 70 kilometers off the coast of Borneo.
The water depth at the site is approximately
90 meters, which makes this the deepest SPM in
operation to date. A fourth SALM is being fabricated
for placement 300 kilometers east of the Malay
Peninsula in approximately 73 meters of water. Both
these moorings are similar to the Brega SALM,
except their risers are much longer because of the
water depths. Both facilities will be used to
permanently moor storage vessels that will receive
crude oil from nearby production platforms and
load it onto tankers moored alongside. Initially,
the mooring off Borneo is being used to load tankers
directly from production (Figure 13).
Technology for the SALM has been licensed
by Exxon to SBM, IMODCO, and SOFEC of
Houston, all of which are designing and fabricating
SALMs for a number of sites. Two will be installed
off the coast of Saudi Arabia to export crude for
ARAMCO. The Chinese Petroleum Corporation
has ordered a SALM to import oil to Taiwan. And
a contract has just been awarded by Burmah
Exploration for a SALM to be located in 1 60 meters
of water in the North Sea an especially severe
environment. Upon installation in 1977, this SALM
will be the deepest tanker mooring.
Exxon recently placed an order for a SALM
to be installed in approximately 32 meters of
water 1 kilometer off the California coast in the
Santa Barbara Channel in early 1977. Oil from an
offshore production platform will be stored in tanks
boom bow hawser moored tanker
pipeline
Figure 8. SPM tower with underwater loading arm.
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Figure 9. SALM system at Brega, Libya.
onshore, then loaded through the SALM to tankers
near shore. This SALM will be the first SPM in the
United States.
Operation of an SPM Terminal
One concept of an offshore oil terminal involves a
cluster of SPMs around a central control platform
(Figure 14). A pipeline links each SPM to the
platform, which contains valving, pumps, and
controls, and is connected by pipeline with storage
tanks onshore. The platform houses operating
personnel and serves as a control center and base for
pilots and launch crews who assist in mooring the
tankers.
The following operation is typical of that
practiced at most SPMs. A pilot meets an incoming
tanker some distance from the terminal and directs
it along a designated ship lane to the mooring site.
He plans his final approach on a course into the
predominant environment so that maximum control
is maintained and so that the buoy passes to one
side, usually to port of the vessel. Since this approach
is in open water, and the heading of the vessel can
be planned to maintain steerage, tugs are rarely used.
Prior to the approach a launch crew inspects
and prepares the SPM. During the final approach
one launch pulls the floating hose to the side away
from the tanker's path, while another launch
takes a messenger line lowered from the bow of the
tanker and proceeds ahead of the tanker until
contact is made with a floating pickup line attached
to the mooring line.
The last stage of the approach is made at
very slow speed so that the tanker comes to a stop
25-50 meters from the buoy. The messenger and
pickup lines are winched on board, and the end of
the mooring line is made fast to fittings on the bow
of the tanker.
Figure JO. SALM buoy, anchor chain, anchor swivel, and
universal joint being assembled.
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One of the principal concerns at piers and
sea islands is striking the fixed structure during
maneuvering to the berth. At an SPM the tanker does
not have to maneuver so close to the mooring, and
there is less chance of impact. SPM buoys are
designed to take a direct impact without damage
to the buoy or the tanker. As an example, at Brega
a tanker accidently passed completely over the
SALM buoy without causing any damage to buoy
or tanker and without endangering the oil-carrying
parts of the system.
After the tanker is securely moored to the
buoy, the ends of the floating hose strings are
brought to the side of the tanker. The ends are
lifted to the deck and connected to the tanker
manifold. After a final inspection of the system,
valves are opened and pumping begins slowly at
first, to assure there are no problems. Throughout
the entire pumping operation, vigilance is maintained
for leaks in the piping system and for other potential
problems. Although SPMs are usually designed to
moor tankers safely in waves of 8.5 meters maximum
Figure 12. Tanker moored to Okinawa SALM. Figure 1 3. Tanker loading crude oil from production
through SALM.
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Figure 14. Offshore terminal with platform and SPMs.
height or more, pumping operations are normally
suspended above about 7 meters maximum wave
height.
At the conclusion of cargo transfer, or
when it is necessary to leave the mooring due to
worsening storm conditions, pumping is stopped
and valves on the tanker manifold and pipeline are
closed. A valve at the end of the SPM hose is also
closed. The small amount of oil between the tanker
and hose valves is drained into a drip pan beneath
the manifold as the hose is disconnected, to assure
that no oil escapes into the ocean. The hose is then
lowered back to the sea surface.
Finally, the tanker applies power to move
forward on the mooring while the mooring line is
disconnected, then sails from the SPM. Because
launches are not needed during unmooring, the
tanker can safely depart even in a storm.
Offshore Port Plans
The Deepwater Port Act of 1974 established that
the Department of Transportation administer
deepwater ports. The Secretary of Transportation
has set up the Office of Deepwater Ports to prepare
rules and coordinate activities of the Department
of Transportation and other federal agencies in
carrying out the provisions of the law. The U.S.
Coast Guard, which had already organized a
deepwater ports group, plays a key role in these
activities. Proposed rules for the design, construction,
and operation of deepwater ports, prepared by the
Coast Guard, were published in the May 7, 1975,
Federal Register. Final regulations are expected to
be issued late in 1975.
Studies of offshore oil ports for several
sites have progressed to the point where applications
for permits will be made as soon as the new
Deepwater Ports Office is ready to receive them.
Seadock plans to construct a port approximately
40 kilometers off the coast of Freeport, Texas.
LOOP (Louisiana Offshore Oil Port) intends to
build a port approximately 30 kilometers off the
Louisiana coast, almost due south of New Orleans.
Each project is sponsored by a separate consortium
of oil, pipeline, and chemical companies; and each
calls for a cluster of SPMs arranged about a central
control platform, as shown in Figure 14. The oil
would be distributed to refineries in the area and
to long-distance pipelines. LOOP and Seadock
looked at the CALM and SALM in operating and
hurricane conditions as part of an extensive model-
testing program in 1974; LOOP has decided to apply
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for permits for the SALM as its tanker mooring
system.
There have been several other proposals for
deepwater ports, but they are not so far along in
planning. Ameriport is being considered for a
location approximately 50 kilometers off the coast
of Mobile, Alabama, and would be developed by
Southern Pacific Pipeline International Tank
Terminals, a private company. Initially the project
was sponsored by Alabama and Mississippi.
Like LOOP and Seadock, Ameriport would consist
of a platform and several SPMs. Another plan,
Massport is sponsored by the Massachusetts Port
Authority and involves construction of several
offshore SPMs north of Boston. Proposals have
also been made for sites off the coasts of Maine,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Delaware, and the
Carolinas. However, these projects are only in
preliminary stages and some may not proceed.
In summary, the use of very large tankers
and offshore ports is the best solution to the
problem of transporting large quantities of oil
over long distances. Simple and economical, this
method can also dramatically reduce the risk of
environmental damage due to accidents. It has
been proven to work in other parts of the world
and can work in the U.S. as well.
John F. Flory is a senior project engineer at Exxon Research
and Engineering Company, Florham Park, New Jersey. He
has been engaged in research and development of offshore
oil terminals for Exxon for the past nine years and currently
heads a group responsible for the desigJi and development
of single point moorings.
Except where noted, illustrations are courtesy of
Exxon Research and Engineering Company.
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Offshore
Industrial-Port
Islands
by Robert B. Biggs
When the United States was still an agriculture-based
society, ports were developed to transport goods
and products from the hinterland. Ports were
generally located as far inland as possible, and road-
rail transport systems were developed accordingly.
As the country evolved into an industrialized
society, these ports became the hubs of activity.
Industrialists took advantage of the fact that water
transportation of raw materials and products was
cheap, the harbors contained abundant water for
cooling and waste disposal, and a supply of workers
was already available. Through the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, industrial activity,
the quantity and diversity of effluents, and the
population all increased around these ports.
Technology of ship construction improved so that
ships' drafts exceeded the water depths of most
ports, necessitating extensive dredging operations
to deepen the channels. This in turn forced new
industries to locate along the channels to receive
or ship materials.
As ports developed, occasional fish kills
occurred and there was a general decline in
commercial fishery production of estuaries. In the
mid-twentieth century, researchers studying
estuarine processes began to document the
biological importance of the estuary as a spawning
and nursery ground for a significant part of the
coastal area. Oceanographers learned that
circulation of estuarine waters is generally weak
and that their capacity to absorb pollutants is
limited.
Major industrial centers, such as New York, are located on
estuaries too shallow to accommodate many modern ships,
too limited to assimilate industrial wastes, and too crowded
to provide suitable sites for the construction or expansion
of basic services and heavv industries. (The Port Authority
ofNY and NJ)
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The U.S. is now in the position where
major industrial centers, dependent on water
transportation, are located on estuaries that are
too shallow to handle modern ships and too small to
assimilate wastes, and that are incredibly valuable as
a biological-recreational resource. Further, the
U.S. is now confronted with a complex situation
affecting its industrial development and its ability
to maintain a vigorous economy and an adequate
national defense posture. On the Atlantic Coast
in particular, and on the Gulf Coast to a lesser
extent, there are intensive onshore population
pressures and the need to develop facilities for
basic services and heavy industries. Among the
industrial activities essential to the economy but
difficult to construct, expand, and operate are
petroleum refineries and petrochemical plants;
deepwater terminals for petroleum and petroleum
products, and dry-bulk cargo; electric power plants;
unloading and regasification facilities for liquefied
natural gas (LNG); and solid-waste, sludge, and
dredge-spoil disposal.
With a broad range of economic,
environmental, and social constraints, it is becoming
increasingly difficult to find suitable sites for
deepwater ports close to areas that can accommodate
heavy industrial plants that refine, concentrate, and
convert the bulk raw materials into oil products,
primary metals, and fertilizers. Some of these
processes are heavy users of electric power and can
best be justified if located close to generating plants.
It is also becoming mcreasingly difficult to find
acceptable sites for electric power plants to serve
the highly developed but still rapidly growing
coastal metropolitan areas.
The National Science Foundation funded a
conceptual design study of multipurpose industrial-
port islands suitable for construction off the Atlantic
and Gulf coasts and built to accommodate the type
of industries listed above. The U.S. has limited
experience with the concept of single-purpose
offshore structures. A nuclear power plant has been
proposed for location off the New Jersey coast, and
a sand-filled coal transshipment island has been
suggested for Lower Delaware Bay.
The artificial industrial island concept
argues that in a conventional setting there are some
activities that are both necessary and noxious.
It suggests that, based on the geography of demand,
there are locations that will better accept the
presence of such activities, be it for a social,
ecological, or other "noneconomic" reason. It then
argues that the economic feasibility can be judged
only when activity and real estate value have been
integrated for maximum effectiveness while
recognizing relative cost differences between natural
and created land, and the potential cost differences
for pollution management, process development,
and logistic support.
In order to complete a conceptual design of
a multipurpose offshore industrial-port island, one
must answer the following questions:
-What industries would be suitable for island location?
-Where, based on market demand, could an island
be built?
How should the industries be arranged on the
island, what raw materials would be required, and
what wastes would be produced?
How could such an island be built?
-What would be the environmental effects of
construction and operation?
-What legal-jurisdictional arrangements are available
or need to be developed?
Industry Candidates and Location
Several of the main criteria used in the preliminary
selection of island candidates were the importance
of the industry to the economy and the national
defense; the history of plant site acquisition
problems; the source, volume, and form of raw
materials needed; the noxious, nuisance, or
hazardous nature of the industry; and whether the
industry is labor or capital intensive. Based on
these criteria, a list of eleven candidate industries
was developed: petroleum refining; petrochemicals
manufacturing; electric power generation (both
nuclear and fossil fueled); deepwater terminals;
LNG regasification; urban solid-waste processing
and disposal; fertilizer manufacturing; paper
manufacturing; electrometals processing; iron
reduction and steelmaking; and nuclear fuel
reprocessing.
D. M. Bragg of Texas A&M University has
assessed the possiblity of siting such industries on
artificial islands and concludes that oil refining,
electric power generation, petrochemicals
manufacturing, LNG regasification, and nuclear
fuel reprocessing are the most promising candidates.
(Table 1 presents a summary of general mainland
problems and island advantages for these industries.)
As for the location of a multipurpose sea
island based on high market demand for industrial
products and unavailability of on-land sites, the
Atlantic Coast from Hatteras northward is a prime
area for consideration. The southeastern Atlantic
Coast and the Gulf Coast have either low market
demand or adequate onshore sites.
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Table 1. Candidate industries by rank.
Rank Industry Mainland problems Island advantages
Oil refining
2 Electric power generation
(fossil only)
Electric power generation
(nuclear)
Petrochemicals manufacturing
Liquified natural gas
regasification
Nuclear fuel reprocessing
1. Emissions and air quality
2. Aesthetics of plant
3. Land use conflicts
4. Possibility of oil spills
5. Danger of fire and
explosions
6. Delivery of imported
crude oil
7. Strong public opposition
1. Disposal of waste heat
2. Removes large land areas
from other uses
3. Disposal of waste sludge
from stack scrubbers
4. Transmission line
corridors have poor
aesthetics and tie up
large areas of land
1. Disposal of waste heat
2. Fear of radiation leakage
3. Large area of land tied
up for radiation
exclusion zone
4. Fear of nuclear blast
5. Strong public opposition
1. Lack of feedstock
supplies
2. Land use conflicts
3. Possibly hazardous
emissions
4. Aesthetics of plants
5. Impact of local air
quality
6. Danger of fire and
explosion
7. Strong public opposition
1. Safety problems with
LNG vessels in crowded
harbors and channels
2. Fear of leaks and
explosions at terminals
3. Extent of hazard from
explosions and fires
unknown
1. Radiation hazards
2. Large land area tied up
for exclusion zone
3. Security of plutonium
from theft for use as
weapon material is
difficult to maintain
1. Emissions would dissipate
over ocean
2. No aesthetic conflict
3. No land use conflict
4. Oil spills would be kept
away from coast
5. Removal of fire hazard
from community
6. Direct delivery of imported
oil
1 . Could use ocean as heat
sink
2. Could receive boiler fuel
via water transportation
3. Could dispose of waste
sludge as island fill
4. Part of power transmission
activity would be
underwater and out of
sight
5. Source of power for island
industries
1 . Could use ocean as heat
sink
2. Would remove plant from
contact with people
3. Water area around island
would create exclusion
zone
1 . New refineries could
provide feedstocks
2. Emissions would dissipate
over ocean
3. No land use conflict
4. Removes plant from
contact with public
1. LNG ships would stay out
of crowded harbors
2. Danger of leaks and
explosions removed from
populated areas
3. Would provide source of
natural gas for other
industries on island
1. Radiation hazard would be
removed from populated
areas
2. Water around island would
form exclusion zone
3. Security of plutonium more
easily maintained on an
island
Source: Bragg, 1975, Market demand and general location options for artificial islands.
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Plant Size, Raw Materials, and Products
Island industries can be organized in any number of
ways. For example, the core industry could be
fossil-fueled electric power generation for the
mainland; then satellite industries would be sized
around the availability of "excess" electric power.
Alternatively, a petrochemicals facility or a refinery
could serve as the core around which an industrial
complex is built. Obviously the number of workers
needed, the pollutants discharged, and the raw
materials and products moving to and from the
island will vary with the kinds and size of industry.
Given that the northeastern Atlantic Coast
lacks suitable onshore industrial sites and that
refinery siting seems to be a particularly acute
problem (Table 2), I have selected a 500,000-barrel-
per-day refinery as the core industry in developing
an example of a complex that could be constructed
off the northeastern United States.
W. G. Yeich of Gilbert Associates has
developed the needs for area, workers, utilities
(power steam, water, etc.), and raw materials for
an industrial island with a refinery core. Figure 1
shows the flow of materials at an island site based
on a 500,000-barrel-per-day refinery. The key
input to the island is imported crude oil and/or oil
produced in nearby offshore fields. The key outputs
are refined petroleum products and petrochemicals.
All of the other industrial tenants are rational
extensions of these key facilities, as secondary
processing, maintenance and operation support, or
waste disposal. The complex is served by a common
waste collection and treatment facility.
The crude-oil refinery and petrochemicals
plant produce high-value clean fuels, industrial
chemical feedstocks, and polymers for export. Off-
gas not committed to the refinery is used as fuel and
feedstock for an ammonia fertilizer industry.
Refinery wastes having fuel value are used in the
island's steam electric power plant. Waste heat from
the refinery and power plant is used to the maximum
extent possible by the food processing and paper
industry tenants. Chemical effluents are processed
in the island's waste treatment facility to achieve
chemical recovery and maximum water reuse.
Table 2. Refineries planned but not constructed.
Company
crude oil
sulfur, potash,
phosphate rock
wood
refinery
petrochemicals
fertilizer
paper
seafood
power generation
desalination
waste treatment
raw seafood
fuel liquids
industrial chemicals
and polymers
fertilizer
paper
processed seafood
Raw Materials to Island
Crude oil
Potash
Phosphate rock
Sulfur
Wood
Raw seafood
Refuse
Products Leaving Island
Hydrocarbon liquids
Polymer prills/chips
Fertilizer (dry)
Salts
Paper rolls
Processed seafood (frozen)
Minimum storage on island, 10 days.
Data provided by W. G. Yeich.
Movement of Materials
(average per diem rates)
85,000 tons/day (approx. one 250,000 dwt
VLCC every 72 hrs. on 24-hr, turnaround)
2650 tons/day
13,000 tons/day
1 500 tons/day
300 tons/day kraft, or 420 cords/day
270 tons/day
24,000 tons/day
75,000 tons/day
5000 tons/day
8500 tons/day
230 tons/day
385 tons/day
270 tons/day
Figure 1. Flow of materials at an island site whose core industry is a 500,000-barrel-per-day refinery.
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existing sea bottom
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Figure 2. Sections of typical sea island designs, from top to bottom: unprotected beach; polder; dike and fill; sheet pile
cell protected; and caisson protected.
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Steam and electricity are supplied by the steam
electric power plant, which is fueled primarily by
combustibles from solid wastes imported from
mainland municipalities and beneficiated on the
island. Fresh water is produced from seawater in a
desalination plant and from recycled waste water,
using steam as the heat source. Brine from the
desalination plant is evaporated and further processed
to produce refractories, commercially valuable salts,
metals, and industrial gases. The island's acid
requirements are supplied by an acid plant using
sulfur recovered from the refinery crude runs,
sulfates extracted from brine, imported sulfur and
phosphate rock, and ammonia from the fertilizer
complex. Thus the liquid wastes produced by the
island's industries will be designed to approach zero.
The size of the island is based on present,
state of the art, land-based industries. Area
requirements, grouped by function, are as follows:
Raw material unloading and storage 285 acres
Product storage and loading 185 acres
Manufacturing plants 995 acres
Utilities 335 acres
Total area 1800 acres
The total number of people employed per
8-hour shift on such an island complex would be
about 1600; and the investment in processing units,
exclusive of the cost of the island itself, would
approach $4 billion.
Building a Sea Island
There are several techniques available for constructing
a sea island from 1 500 to 2000 acres in size. The
Dutch, in particular, have been extremely successful
in open-sea construction. The following design-
construction methods have all been used or proposed:
unprotected beach; polder; dike and fill; sheet pile
cell; and caisson (Figure 2).
J. J. Bonasia of F. R. Harris has evaluated
each of the methods and has concluded that the
unprotected beach and the polder are not suited to
open-water, offshore conditions. In the case of the
unprotected beach, great amounts of fill are required
and constant maintenance is necessary to replace the
lost material. With the polder the possibility of a
catastrophic failure (with loss of up to 1600 lives)
due to an earthquake is high because we cannot
predict (in real time) the occurrence of such an event.
In selecting the specific location for a sea
island, a number of engineering factors must be
evaluated, including the possibility of seismic
(earthquake) events; suitability of foundation
materials (coarse sands or gravels are preferred);
proximity to shipping and air-traffic lanes, as well
as disposal areas for munitions; oceanic variables
such as waves, tides, storm surge, and currents; and
meteorological constraints such as dominant winds,
frequency of hurricanes and tornadoes, as well as
fog and ice.
The most efficient shape for a sea island,
from an engineering point of view, is a circle because
it maximizes area and minimizes perimeter (which
must be protected with armor). We have not
considered innovations in island design that are
beyond the state of the art. Decked or multistory
refineries, for example, could save considerable land
space but have not been designed and tested.
Similarly, automated underwater process units
might provide significant economies but have not
been adequately tested.
A possible configuration for an 1 800-acre
sea island, with a harbor on the lee side and a
smooth curve presented to the principal direction
of wave attack, is illustrated in Figure 3. Pertinent
data are as follows:
Elevation above mean
low water (MLW)
Total area
Radius
Wharfage
5 meters
8.0 square kilometers
2106 meters
5540 meters
*-" f
Volume of sand required 246 x 10 cubic meters
The circle limits the possibility of localized
concentration of wave energy on the sea defense
system. The breakwater prevents refracted waves
and waves generated by offshore winds from
entering the harbor. Minimum oscillation and
resonance can be expected. The island is oriented
to the southeast, the direction of the principal wave
attack. The harbor is also protected from northeast
storms.
There is a deepwater, one-way channel with
a 23-meter depth at MLW for Very Large Crude
Carriers (VLCCs) of 250,000 dead weight tonnage.
All vessels would follow the deepwater channel into
the harbor and leave by the opposite end, thereby
adding to the safety of operations. VLCCs would
leave the harbor directly ahead, without the need
for turn-around. Floating and fixed visual aids to
navigation would mark the channel.
Access to and from the island would be
accomplished by ships, aircraft, and a twin-tube
vehicular tunnel. If expansion consists of adding an
island toward shore, then during the initial
construction it would be necessary to provide for a
turn-off to the future island. Shift changes could
be managed by the use of buses to transport all
personnel to and from shore. This method would
insure shift changes under all weather conditions.
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The tunnel would also provide for truck transport
of manufactured products. An alternative plan
would be for key personnel to live on the island,
perhaps on seven- to thirty-day shifts. Since island
real estate is expensive, facilities for island living
would be a matter of economics.
The estimated order of magnitude cost to
construct the island is $550 million at 1975 prices.
These costs include mobilization, dredging and sub-
base preparation, rock protection, sand fill,
deepwater channel dredging, caissons, breakwater,
and berthing facilities. The estimated order of
magnitude cost of a 13-kilometer-long twin-tube
vehicular tunnel is $200 million and includes two
ventilation shafts onshore and one at sea. These
costs, of course, are extremely sensitive to distance
from shore and water depth.
Environmental Effects
The offshore island concept cannot become a
repository for all our problems out of sight, out
of mind. Very careful planning for the environment
is required. Particulate emission control, liquid
waste treatment and disposal, and spill safeguards
are important to the public health whether on an
island or onshore. However, there may be some
environmental advantages to an offshore island:
use of the ocean as a heat sink; noise abatement;
solid-waste disposal that is favorable to island
expansion; and other benefits stemming from
distance and diffusion. In addition, it may be more
desirable from an environmental perspective to
preserve or rehabilitate estuarine and coastal areas
at the cost of potentially less productive shelf regions.
Considering the volume of fill necessary to
construct an island, dredging could take 10 years.
During that time turbidity would be significantly
increased in the water near the construction site,
and bottom habitat destroyed. On the other hand,
2500 meters of armored protection might improve
the local marine habitat and ultimately benefit
biological productivity in the area.
L. Watling of the University of Delaware,
in attempting to evaluate the biological impact of
the construction and operation of an artificial
island, has concluded that "this could not
immediately be done with any degree of confidence
for the following reasons: a) the available
information about the present condition of the
environment was, for the most part, incomplete;
b) little was known about the responses of oceanic
species to pollutant additives; and c) as a result of
b) there were essentially no usable criteria by which
one could measure projected effects."
Large structures built relatively close to the
coast will often affect the erosion or deposition of
sand along the shoreline. A structure such as a
breakwater or an offshore island changes the
characteristics of the waves behind it. Waves are
refracted and diffracted around the edges of the
structure, and the wave heights are lowered in the
shadow zone behind the island. If this zone extends
to shore, sand moving along the coast will begin to
build up in the area of reduced wave energy, cutting
off the natural longshore transport of sand and
creating an area of erosion to the downdrift side of
the island's shadow.
If it is desirable to protect a section of
coastline that has a relatively erodable material on
the downdrift side, the island should be built far
enough from shore to minimize its impact on the
coast (but, again, at a higher cost). Extensive
refraction and diffraction studies are necessary to
insure that the island will have little or no effect
on the shoreline.
Other environmental considerations that
must be quantified in order to assess environmental
impact include the land-side tunnel, dock, and
airport. The 1600 employees per shift (in the
example given earlier) will have to be transported
from the island to their homes on the mainland.
The landfall of the tunnel, for example, should
therefore be located near highway-railroad
transportation away from the coast.
Legal-Jurisdictional Arrangements
At the present time legal-jurisdictional issues are
cloudy with respect to the location of an artificial
multipurpose industrial-port island on the U.S.
continental shelf. If such a structure were to be
built within a state's territorial waters (three miles),
the state would be able to approve and control
island activities. In order to minimize environmental
impact (in terms of noise, odor, visual aesthetics;
and the effect on the shoreline), the proposed
location would probably be farther than three miles
offshore.
G. J. Mangone of the University of
Delaware, in an assessment of the legal-political
aspects of artificial islands, has concluded that,
in general, under international law, states may place
islands for any purposes within their territorial
waters, subject to certain navigation easements.
States may also locate islands on their continental
shelves for purposes of exploring or exploiting the
resources of the shelf. However, there are well-
established rules enjoining any attempt by a state
to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty.
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Figure 3. Proposed offshore industrial-port island plan, alternatives 1 and 2.
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Only such activities as navigation, fishing, the laying
of pipelines and cables, and overflight are permitted
to states on the high seas.
The major legal consideration of the
location of an artificial island, from the U.S. point
of view, is whether it lies within U.S. waters, in
which case it comes under the constitutional
jurisdiction of the state as well as the federal
government. On the other hand, if it lies beyond
the territorial waters, it comes under the jurisdiction
of the federal government, except as statute may
specifically provide, for the application of state law
or a state's participation in federal regulation or
control.
Conclusion
In March 1975, W. S. Gaither chaired a workshop on
major problems and promising research approaches
related to offshore industrial-port islands. There
were more than 50 participants, representing federal
and state government, industry, and academia.
Participants agreed that the major problems to be
solved before large-scale investment in island
construction can begin center on the legal-political,
economic, and environmental issues. The
environmental concerns could be eased if a
programmatic environmental impact statement were
developed. The legal and economic issues are almost
inseparable. There is a need for significant new
legislation that will permit an offshore island to be
constructed and operated, and this legislation will
have to be tailored to the economic realities of
industries that locate there.
Robert B. Biggs is associate professor ofgeology in the
College ofArts and Science, associate professor of marine
studies and assistant dean for academic affairs in the College
of Marine Studies, University of Delaware.
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Present and Future Uses of
Floating Platforms
? 's rendering of Aqiiapolis, the Japanese government 's pavilion at Expo '75 on the
Motobu Peninsula of Okinawa. Tfie floating artificial island, 100 meters on a side, is
considered to be a prototype of the future marine city. (Consulate General ofJapan, New York)
by John P. Craven
On April 23, 1975, the 18,000-ton floating platform
Aquapolis arrived at its destination in Okinawa
after a long tow from its construction site in
Hiroshima. The feature attraction of the 1975
International Ocean Exposition, it is architecturally
designed to demonstrate the floating city of the
future. For many people this exhibit will be
futuristic; for a perceptive few it will represent a
practical concept to be realized before a decade
is over.
On July 4, 1975, Mobil Oil's production
platform Condeep, displacing 330,000 tons, was
towed from its fabrication site in Stavanger, Norway,
to its production area some 190 kilometers at sea.
For many individuals this leviathan is merely a
feature of energy production, with little relevance
to the world in general; for a perceptive few it is
overwhelming proof that major industrial facilities
and complexes can be economically and
environmentally best located on floating or quasi-
floating artificial structures.
When viewed in combination, the Aquapolis
represents the most advanced functional concept for
floating platforms, while the Condeep proves that
the engineering can match the functional concept.
These facilities are but two of the ever-increasing
flotilla of floating platforms for commercial and
industrial use. Nearly 300 mobile drilling rigs have
been built on a world-wide basis. Of these about
15 are submersible units, approximately 140 are
jack-up (self-elevating) rigs, 70 are drill ships or
barges, and 75 are semi-submersibles. In addition
to oil-oriented designs, there are a number of
specialized geophysical drill ships, several ship-borne
chemical plants, a few incinerator ships, some
floating universities, and the Ekofisk and Dubai oil
storage facilities.
In the advanced planning and design stage,
with a committed capital investment, are floating
nuclear power plants and liquified natural gas
facilities. In advanced concept design are floating
airports and fossil-fueled power plants. Other
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operations that are under consideration include
military staging bases, steel mills, oil refineries,
manganese nodule processing plants, and ammunition
storage depots. Indeed, there are few urban or
industrial activities that could not be carried out to
advantage on a floating or quasi-floating structure.
Three factors combine to increase the
number and variety of sea-based platforms: stability,
economics, and environmental suitability.
Stability
Stability has been achieved through the use of either
a conventional hull with very large displacement or,
more easily, a semi-submerged platform. The
concept of stable ocean platforms is not new. The
modern semi-submersible was first proposed for the
Armstrong Seadrome of the 1930s, which was
designed as an oceanic airfield to make possible the
trans-Atlantic flight of short-range passenger
planes. A number of these platforms were to have
been located in the Mid-Atlantic, spaced in
accordance with the range of existing aircraft.
Development of the Seadrome was thwarted by the
successful extension of the range of commercial
aircraft.
World War II saw the installation of fixed
offshore platforms as radar stations. Many of these
"Old Shakeys" did not survive the storm conditions
to which they were exposed. Nevertheless, they
were the predecessor of the "Uncle Charleys"
(the standard oil rigs of the 1960s) and a wide
variety of mutations thereof. The fixed platform
became increasingly less economic as facilities were
sited in greater depths. A number ofjack-up rigs
were designed, some as tall as major skyscrapers,
but they are becoming a smaller percentage of the
oil industry fleet. Dynamically positioned
(unmoored and propelled) drill ships were also
developed. However, the surviving dominant
structure appears to be the semi-submerged,
dynamically positioned platform. As of May 1975,
100 floating drill rigs were under construction,
compared to 63 jackups; and of the floating rigs,
59 were semi-submersibles.
Semi-submersible units have demonstrated
that stability in high seas is possible and that station
keeping can be accomplished without mooring. The
basic principle of the semi-submersible is that the
major portion of the hull is located in deep water,
well below the influence of waves. Rather thin
struts with a small water plane area extend above
the surface. Well above the average wave height
is a platform on which are mounted light fixtures
and man-occupied spaces. The most advanced
structure of this type was represented by the Mohole
(for the so-called Mohorovicic discontinuity)
platform, designed to drill through the earth's crust.
It was partially fabricated, at a great expense to the
U.S. taxpayer, then terminated in 1966 by the
Executive and the Congress. Adopted by Japanese
shipbuilders, the design became the basis for their
highly successful mobile oil rigs.
Stability has many advantages beyond the
safety of the structure itself. It is possible to design
platforms that will never in their expected lifetimes
exceed accelerations of
.02#, the limit of human
ability to perceive motion. Of equal significance,
this acceleration is far below earthquake loads. As
a result, structural requirements for machinery and
buildings on the platforms are much lower than for
those built on "solid" ground. It is also possible to
use the platforms for functions that are absolutely
demanding in terms of human performance (e.g.,
precision manufacturing, observatories, billiards).
Economics
While stability and safety initially led industry to
choose stable platforms, economics dictates the
current trend. Factors that make offshore floating
platforms economically competitive with land-based
counterparts are multiple production in a single
facility, economies of scale, and use of prestressed
concrete. The Westinghouse-Tenneco study of
floating nuclear power plants showed them to be
more economical than the land-based equivalents
after a limited production run. Cost-saving features
included the elimination of site-specific design;
shipyard fabrication as opposed to on-site
construction; bargeloads rather than truckloads of
concrete; lessened impact of an earthquake; and the
elimination of foundation and site preparation costs,
land acquisition costs, and logistic connections, such
as roads and utilities.
Other research has indicated similar
economies. Two conservative studies of floating
fossil-fueled power plants by the Oceanic Institute
at the University of Hawaii indicated essentially a
cost trade-off between land-based and fixed platform
facilities. But with floating complexes there is an
economic advantage of about two years' less lead
time due solely to the elimination of administrative
procedures that now encumber coastal zone
construction.
The emerging conclusion is that floating
platforms are economically equal or superior to
their land-based counterparts when the function to
be performed requires high volume-to-area ratios,
when the absolute size of the structure is large (i.e.,
greater than 15,000 tons), and where competing
land costs are high (i.e., from $1 to $10 per square
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foot). Thus office buildings, manufacturing plants,
bulk storage facilities, and power plants are amenable
to siting on floating platforms, whereas airports,
which require large amounts of surface area, are
rarely if ever cost competitive.
Environmental Suitability
With this feature there is a curious counter effect.
Simply stated, the open ocean is perhaps the easiest
and safest environment for industrial processes vital
to the society; but the public has been led to believe
that the open ocean is the most fragile and easily
polluted of man's environments. This scientific
absurdity exists despite the fact that the extensive
body of data indicates that such major oil spills as
Torrey Canyon and Santa Barbara have as yet had
no measurable long-term environmental effect;
that such major nuclear accidents as the loss of the
submarines Thresher and Scorpion, whose reactors
must have ruptured, have not produced and do not
produce measurable nuclear effects; that the mercury
in highly migratory species such as swordfish and
tuna is produced not by man but by nature; that
thermal pollution of the ocean is a technological
feat beyond the power production capabilities of
man, even if he were inclined to engage in such a
project; that there is more biological waste than
treated waste in the ocean;* and that the ocean is the
only major environment that rapidly terminates
virus vectors. As long as due care is taken to protect
the food chain, the open ocean is environmentally
superior to any other environment for the siting of
potentially polluting facilities.
A major caveat, of course, is that these
statements do not apply to estuaries, small bays,
and other bodies of water having limited circulation.
Floating platform communities would therefore be
positioned seaward of these vulnerable areas, at
least three miles from the coast. Further, they
would be deployed only where continental shelves
are narrow and oceanic waters close to shore. Such
conditions exist along the western coasts of most
continents, around the Caribbean, and off such
island groups as Hawaii and Japan.
Social Considerations
The three technological advantages of floating
platforms-stability, economy, and environmental
suitability do not of themselves guarantee the
extensive use of platforms. Sociological factors
*According to John Isaacs of Scripps Institution of
Oceanography, the almost 6 million metric tons of
anchovies off Southern California alone produce as much
fecal material as 90 million people, or about 10 times the
population of Los Angeles.
must be equally attractive. The record of man's
socialization indicates that the trend to floating
platforms is as attractive for this reason as it is for
others. Indeed most human societies evolved about
a configuration of land and water that was
appropriate for the scale of their technology. In
tracing this evolutionary process one notes the
Neolithic lake communities of 2000 B.C., which
matched the capabilities of the coracle and raft; the
river societies of the Nile, the Indus, and the Tigris
and Euphrates, which equalled the scale of the river
barge; the Aegean societies chronicled by Homer,
which corresponded to the capabilities of the
elemental galley, even as the Phoenicians dominated
the eastern Mediterranean with biremes and triremes,
or the Romans the entire Mediterranean with the
zenith of that line. The Hanseatic League of the
fourteenth century matched the scale of the cog,
which, evolving into the carrack and the caravel,
gave impetus to the brief domination by Spain
Model of the 330,000-ton Condeep Beryl A platform (see
cover). Nineteen caissons form the base, each 167 feet high
and 66 feet in diameter, with 2-foot-thick concrete walls.
Tliree 310-foot-high concrete pylons support the two-level
deck structure, which is about the size of a football field.
Along one side of the deck are five-story-high living quarters.
A heliport and two drilling derricks top off the $300 million
platform. (Mobil Oil Corporation)
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and Portugal and provided the means for British rule
with the frigate, brig, brigantine, and schooner. This
pattern can be observed in modern times when the
nations of rising affluence are those dominating the
sea lanes with supertankers, large cargo carriers,
floating platforms, and artificial islands.
Identification of historical changes in
sea technology is rather easy, unlike predicting
which land-sea complexes will be most important in
years to come. It is nevertheless possible to detect
some patterns in ancient civilizations that may form
the basis for a model of the new oceanic societies.
In particular, the Neolithic lake societies of Britain,
Switzerland, Africa, and Asia had so many features
in common that one can conclude that their
independent evolution resulted from the basic needs
of social man. As a hunter, man followed the small
game that migrated to the shores of the lake seeking
water. The seeds of berries and plants dropped on
the shore by these animals began to grow and mature,
inducing the hunter to adopt agrarian ways and
settle on the lake shores. These societies quickly
learned that the best means of moving the large and
heavy game caught on the mountain slopes was to
drag them downhill to the nearest point on the lake
shore and transport them by raft to their destination.
The advantages of water transport and the need for
defense against predators animal and human-
resulted in the construction of platforms on stilts in
the center of the lake. The lake also served as a
reservoir for the disposal and oxygenation of wastes,
which provided food for an abundant supply of fish.
The basic requirements of defense, waste
disposal, food supply, shelter, and socialization gave
rise to communities organized along similar lines on
a world-wide basis. This pattern serves as a model
for what a three-dimensional water-based Neolithic
society might have looked like. In such a society
the land is reserved primarily for sites of low-density
functions and agrarian uses, such as game preserves,
farms, recreational fields, and ceremonial grounds.
Sites of high-density activities dwellings,
community gathering places, and facilities for
"industrial" processing, energy generation, and waste
disposal-are located on platforms in the water.
The platforms are organized on three dimensions.
The area below the water is for "industrial" functions,
such as waste treatment processing and heat rejection,
while above the water man lives and socializes. These
two areas are organized from lowest density at the
periphery to congregation at the center. The water
surface is used for transportation from the land
mass to the platforms as well as under the platforms
so that goods may be discharged vertically where
needed.
UVMG
COMMJNM ACTIVITY
Tlie Neolithic lake society.
WGHKNSTY (UNCTIONS
Tlie coastal valley/stable platform community-the lake
model on a modern scale.
Although Neolithic lake communities were
quite stable, overpopulation and the conversion of
lakes into land masses of artificial platforms resulted
in their demise. (Today we have the technology for
population control, but its implementation is far
from complete.)
Considering the success of the Neolithic
lake community as a social organization, one may
well ask why the pattern was not replicated on a
larger scale in bays and estuaries, even in the open
ocean. Indeed it was repeated in sheltered coastal
waters, and exists today in African lakes and
Southeast Asian bays; but its widespread
development was hindered by two basic problems:
the perils of storm, and the discomfort of seasickness.
If modern ocean technology can resolve both of
these problems, then we may expect to see new
coastal societies evolving in a pattern not unlike
that of the Neolithic lake communities.
The envisioned end point is a community
consisting of a redeveloped coastal valley and a
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complex of offshore floating platforms. The valley's
slopes would be reserved for agricultural use and
urban dwellings; the coastal plain for universities,
government centers, parks, golf courses, stadiums,
and other low-density sites. The airport would also
be located on land because it requires a large area.
Power plants, heavy industry, and waste treatment
facilities would be located on the floating platforms,
but below water. The spaces above water would be
occupied by condominiums, office complexes,
shopping centers, theaters, and other buildings for
which economics dictates a high population density
(a floating platform community would house roughly
10,000 people). Connection between the floating
complexes and the land would be accomplished by
marine transport systems for goods and passengers.
These transport systems would have to be fast,
frequent, and stable; they should not terminate at
the coastline but penetrate the land mass through
its valley streams, rivers, and canals.
Prospects
Although one can envision floating platform
communities, the cost of just one complex is
prohibitive, even as an experiment. The realization
of such societies in the near future is therefore a
function of evolution, the pattern of which is already
identifiable. Three essential growth paths must exist:
the development of large, low-cost-per-unit-volume,
super-stable (i.e., with accelerations less than .0\g)
ocean platforms; community acceptance of the
location of urban functions in a sea-based
environment; and the evolution of rapid, efficient,
low-motion, quiet marine mass transportation.
High-speed passenger transit is provided by the Boeing Jet/oil
929 hydrofoil, this one on SeaMite service in Hawaii. The
craft can carry as many as 250 passengers through high seas
at almost 45 knots. Such forms of marine transportation
will facilitate the evolution offloating platform
communities. (Boeing Aerospace Company)
All three of these evolutionary trends are
already well advanced. Large ocean platforms are a
reality, and their sophistication is increasing rapidly.
Although floating platforms face opposition and
rejection in the U.S. where public understanding of
the ocean is, in my opinion, poor and self-defeating,
their acceptance in Europe, Asia, and Japan is
demonstrated by the artificial islands of Holland,
the ocean-based energy facilities of the North Sea,
the Persian Gulf, and the South China Sea, and the
floating factory ships of Japan.
The concept of ocean platforms will be
strengthened by increased attention, at least in the
U.S., to economically and environmentally sound
marine mass transportation systems. Though
development and survival of the forms of marine
transit have been left more to "natural selection"
than to informed planning, it is possible to predict
where we are headed. For canal, river, and calm
water application, almost any craft will do:
displacement barge, fixed-foil hydrofoil, air-
cushioned vehicle, hydroski; and where change of
elevation is involved, even the hovercraft. Fixed-
foil craft are in operation on most waterways and
canals in the U.S.S.R., on Swiss lakes, in the Straits
of Messina, and in the Baltic. When sea state is a
factor, the incidence-controlled hydrofoil, now
operating on the Hong Kong-Macao run and on
Hawaii's inter-island service, will be the surviving
mode for high-speed passenger transit (now more
than 40 knots in high seas). The concrete-hulled
semi-submersible, a derivative of stable platform
development utilizing one or more submarine hulls,
struts, and a cargo platform above the sea, will be
the survivor for roll-on/roll-off light-cargo and
passenger service. Several commercial versions are
now under construction for use as work boats in
the North Sea. Finally, the displacement hull will
be the long-term choice for heavy freight and
bulk cargoes.
The development of economic and effective
forms of marine transportation will open the way
for the seaward extension of urban systems and will
provide the missing link in the evolution toward the
coastal valley/stable platform community the
Neolithic lake model on a twenty-first-century scale.
The prospect is not unpleasant and, indeed, suggests
solutions for many of the problems of a society
facing congestion in its coastal zones.
John P. Craven is dean of marine programs at the University
of Hawaii, Honolulu.
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Demand has been such that we have decided to put a number of issues back on the
press. Limited quantities are available at $3.00 per copy; a 40 percent discount is
offered on orders of five or more copies. We can accept only prepaid orders, and
checks should be made payable to Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. Orders
should be sent to: Oceanus Back Issues, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution,
Woods Hole, MA 02543.
SEA-FLOOR SPREADING, Winter 1974-Plate tectonics is turning out to be one
of the most important theories in modern science, and nowhere is its testing and
development more intensive than at sea. Eight articles by marine scientists explore
continental drift and the energy that drives it, the changes it brings about in ocean
basins and currents, and its role in the generation of earthquakes and of minerals
useful to man.
AIR-SEA INTERACTION, Spring 1974- Air and sea work with and against each
other, mixing the upper ocean, setting currents in motion, building the world's
weather, influencing our lives in the surge of a storm or a sudden change in patterns
of circulation. Seven authors explain research in wave generation, hurricanes, sea
ice, mixing of surface waters, upwelling, long-range weather prediction, and the
effect of wind on circulation.
ENERGYAND THE SEA, Summer 1974-One of our most popular issues. The
energy crisis is merely a prelude to what will surely come in the absence of efforts
to husband nonrenewable resources while developing new ones. The seas offer great
promise in this context. There is extractable energy in their tides, currents, and
temperature differences; in the winds that blow over them; in the very waters
themselves. Eight articles explore these topics as well as the likelihood of finding
oil under the deep ocean floor and of locating nuclear plants offshore.
MARINE POLLUTION, Fall 1974-Popular controversies, such as the one over
whether or not the seas are
"dying," tend to obscure responsible scientific effort
to determine what substances we flush into the ultimate sink, in what amounts, and
with what effects. Some progress is being made in the investigation of radioactive
wastes, DDT and PCB, heavy metals, plastics and petroleum. Eleven authors discuss
this work as well as economic and regulatory aspects of marine pollution.
FOOD FROM THE SEA, Winter 1975-Fisheries biologists and managers are dealing
with the hard realities of dwindling stocks and increasing international competition
for what is left. Seven articles explore these problems and point to ways in which
harvests can be increased through mariculture, utilization of unconventional species,
and other approaches.
DEEP-SEA PHOTOGRAPHY, Spring 1975-A good deal has been written about the
use of hand-held cameras along reefs and in shallow seas. Here eight professionals
look at what the camera has done and can do in the abyssal depths. Topics include
the early history of underwater photography, present equipment and techniques,
biological applications, TV in deep-ocean surveys, the role of photography aboard
the submersible Alvin along the Mid-Atlantic Ridge, and future developments in
deep-sea imaging.
THE SOUTHERN OCEAN, Summer 1975-The first of a regional series (in planning
are issues on the Mediterranean and Caribbean) examining important marine areas
from the standpoint of Oceanographic disciplines most interested in them. Physical,
chemical, and biological oceanographers discuss research in antarctic waters, while a
geologist looks at the ocean floor, meteorologists explain the effect of antarctic
weather on global climate, and a policy expert sets forth the strengths and weaknesses
of international scientific and political relations in the area.
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